Since 1996, Cameroon opted for a ‘piecemeal’ (gradual) decentralisation process, adapted to its specific cultural and political realities. This gradual process and the intricacies inherent in the decentralisation policy framework, it seems has not only led to a very slow process of implementation but after more than two decades, it has also been unable to meet citizens’ aspirations for an ‘empowered citizenship model’ that would have enabled local democracy to flourish for inclusive local development and peace. For instance, it is widely believed by Cameroonians and the international community that the now 5-year long bloody armed conflict that started in October 2016 in the English Speaking North-West (NW) and South-West (NW) regions is partly the result of the failure of the form of the state-a decentralised unitary state adopted by the postcolonial government in the January 1996 Constitutional revision. Faced with this state of affairs and other governance and development challenges, the President of the Republic of Cameroon, H.E. President Paul Biya’s sees effective decentralisation as a key route out of the current predicaments and therefore decided to ‘accelerate’ (fast-track, to use his words) the decentralisation process in order to ‘quickly address’ citizens grievances related to negative governance practices, as contained in his New Year 2018 message to the nation on 31 December 2017. Hence the objective of this article is to analyse and contemplate the extent to which Cameroon’s current decentralisation impetus can indeed achieve its goal. As such the fundamental question in that informs this article is, what are the implications of Cameroon’s past experience with decentralisation for this renewed impetus of Fast-tracking decentralisation in Cameroon for sustainable local development and peace? Constructed around a critical review of relevant literature and a qualitative research design through a desk-based inquiry and interviews with key decentralisation stakeholders, this article arrives at important conclusions.  Perhaps, the most striking finding of this article is that while the trend towards fast-tracking the decentralisation process gives hope for a deep democratic governance for sustainable local development and peace, in Cameroon, when implemented without a certain degree of ‘local democracy’ the process becomes constrained and ‘arrested” at the point implementation. In order words, when the decentralisation policy is shorn of its local democratic ideals and the weak democratic culture of participation remains unaffected by the decentralisation reform in a country context such as Cameroon, characterised by an enduring legacy of authoritarianism and exclusionary politics, the very purpose of the renewed decentralisation impetus can only be defeated despite the apparently ‘strong political will’ at the top of the leadership pyramid.  It is exactly this paradox between policy and practice that need to be seriously considered if this ‘new face’ of Decentralisation in Cameroon is going to produce any sustainable local development and peace dividends.