The African Union’s desire to create the African Criminal Court (ACC), via the Malabo Protocol, with powers similar to the International Criminal Court (ICC), is yet to materialise, although it evokes multifaceted public reactions. Logically, creating the ACC will be gratifying, given its envisaged jurisdiction over suspected crimes, by African leaders against their citizens. But to what extent will the court be powerful? Already, doubts abound over its authority and efficacy, given the Protocol’s Immunity Clause, to prevent prosecuting serving heads of state and senior officials. Other worries include, the court’s financing, its civil societies’ and the masses’ disconnectedness, Africa’s democratisation crisis, and the AU/ICC relations. Nonetheless, others see it as an institution for addressing leaders’ unaccountability, thus, condemning it before its creation is counter-productive. Because, its potentials might shift leaders’ insensitivity to conflicts generation, insecurity, violations of human rights and rule of law, fighting the ICC and not attacking Africa’s democratisation crisis. Via the ACC, African leaders might innovate; empower indigenous manpower and environments to enhance public good. Given these controversies, I use the elite theory and the exploratory research design to appraise the Malabo Protocol and its Immunity Clause’s strengths and weaknesses to discern the ACC’s context, rationale and authority in relations to Africa’s democratic growth or decline. I conclude that, in its present content, the Protocol and its envisaged ACC will weaken rather than strengthen democracy, security and human development in Africa