



## COUNTER INSURGENCY IN WEST AFRICA: AN ASSESSMENT OF AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

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**Abstract:** *This study examined counter insurgency in West Africa: an assessment of African peace and security architecture from 2011 to 2020. The theoretical framework used in this study is Conflict Transformation Theory. The study presented the following hypotheses which are; The structure of the African peace and Security Architecture has a relationship with its effectiveness to counterinsurgency in West Africa 2011-2020. The method of data collection used is documentary. Qualitative descriptive methods based on content analysis was used as a method of data analysis. The study argued that the APSA structural challenges which has over the years not only hindered its progress but also affected the counter insurgency operations of the MNJTF. Finally the study recommends that the structure of the APSA be reviewed in a way that ensures effective and easy way to carry out its goals. Funding should be solved by making sure the mandatory payment from the countries in the organization are made and also sourcing for voluntary contributions.*

**Keywords:** Counter Insurgency, West Africa, African Peace, Security Architecture

### Introduction

Insurgency have remained one of the greatest security challenges in West Africa and has attracted regional response. A significant aspect of such response is the demonstration of shared responsibilities by various nation states in regional cooperation to stamp out the menace of terrorism. In Africa, insurgency has been a major security concern for individual countries as well as regional and continental bodies. African continent is affected by domestic governance failures, within multi-ethnic societies, which often are extreme poor and many African state borders are porous (Cilliers & Gnanguênon, 2016). One of the major obstacles for African peace and development was and still is, the proliferation of armed conflicts, both inter-state and intrastate, insurgency and terrorism, mostly rooted in the religious and cultural beliefs of certain group. Other security threats loom in the

African continent; from conventional challenges such as resource and identity conflicts, and post-conflict stabilization to growing threats from piracy, narcotics trafficking, violent extremism, and organized crime etc. Throughout these years the causes of these conflicts has changed as a result of political and social alterations. However, the lack of political capability and democratic culture contributed to subsequent social problems and unrest, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.

Insurgent activities in West Africa have led to rebellions in many countries including Niger, Mali, Senegal and Nigeria among others. The negativities of insecurity and lethal impacts that have been bedeviling countries of the world have continued to saturate the stabilization efforts of both international and regional peacebuilding organizations. Despite the clear manifestation of an unstable global security environment, countries and regional bodies have

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continued to initiate various prescriptions that go hand in hand with trends of development (Bashir Bala & Usman, 2021).

In Africa, the need for home grown solution to the raising threat of insecurity and Insurgency lead to the establishment of various peace building mechanisms. ECOWAS in its effort establish various legal mechanisms and normative frameworks to deal with West Africa's security challenges. With particular reference to insurgency and terrorism, Article 3 of the ECOWAS Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999) stipulates that combating insurgency is an objective of the regional body. Another initiative is the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering (GIABA), which is mandated to strengthen the capacity of member states to prevent and control insurgent and terrorist financing in the region. On the part of Africa Union, the member states of the African Union (AU) established the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2002 as a long-term structural response to the peace and security challenges on the African continent.

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is a set of institutions, legislation and procedures designed to address conflict prevention and promote peace and security on the African continent. The Constitutive Act of the African Union lays down the legal basis for the APSA. The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, adopted by the AU member states in 2002, defines its structure, objectives and principles. Ten African sub-regional organisations (SROs), to which their respective member states conferred a mandate to act in the area of peace and security, also play a role in the APSA. Eight are Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and two are Regional Mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution (RMs). Cooperation between these organisations and the AU under the APSA are subject to the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is built around structures, objectives, principles and values, as well as decision-making processes relating to the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and development in the continent. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol, which was adopted in July 2002, in Durban, and entered into force in December 2003, outlines the various components of the APSA and their respective responsibilities. Other documents were subsequently adopted to facilitate and expedite the operationalization of the APSA.

The main pillar of the APSA is the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is supported, in the discharge of its mandate, by various structures, namely: the Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund. The relationship between the African Union (AU), which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa, and the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RECs/RMs) is a key APSA component. Interaction between the PSC and other AU organs, such as the Pan-African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, as well as with civil society organizations, is equally vital for the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa. Furthermore, the PSC Protocol provides for partnerships between the AU, on the one hand, the United Nations (UN) and other relevant international stakeholders, on the other hand.

Notwithstanding various effort put in place to combat insecurity and insurgency, the continent especially Nigeria have continued to experience varying degree of insurance and insecurity in the country. Bashir Bala and Usman, (2021) note that despite the laudable initiatives by the Africa Union and complimentary exploits of other sub regional establishments in the form of regional cooperation, effective regional counter-terrorism and



counter-insurgency have been grappled by certain challenges in West Africa. In view of this, the study assesses the African Peace and Security Architectural Structure and its effectiveness in counter insurgency in West Africa

In the light of the above, this study specifically examines the relationship between the structure of the African Peace and Security Architectural (APSA) and its effectiveness to counter insurgency in West Africa.

### **Literature Review**

With continued AU engagement with Member States on conflict prevention, management, resolution and post conflict reconstruction and development as well as peace-building initiatives, progress is being made in the signing and implementation of peace agreements between countries not at peace, or those emerging from decades of conflict and instability (Fahle, 2015). In response, and in line with the provisions of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol), the AU assumed political responsibility to address these challenges and developed its African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Over the last decade, the extent of violent conflict on the continent has reduced, despite the emergence of new security threats (AU, 2016b).

The Commission has recently published the APSA Roadmap 2016 –2020, a strategic document, which builds on the achievements and challenges resulting from the implementation of the previous APSA Roadmaps (2011-2013). The Roadmap manifests the continued determination to ensure further progress, and paves the way for future collaboration between the AU, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) to effectively address security issues and contribute to a more peaceful Africa. Even though the key components of APSA are now more or less fully operational and the number of violent conflicts has been significantly reduced in the past few years, a number of

countries still remain trapped in a vicious cycle of violent conflict and its deadly consequences. A continued strong engagement in support of implementation of peace agreements in Member States emerging from conflict and the fight against terrorism will remain the priorities for the AU (Loteze, 2013). Somalia could be sighted as an example that has made significant progress against Al - Shabaab with support from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). On its part, AMISOM continues to provide guidance on capacity building, and sensitization of communities on countering violent extremism, as part of its comprehensive strategy for reviving policing activities in Somalia.

In the context of conflict prevention, the AU and its sub-regional organizations have developed significant institutional capacity over the past decade to undertake early warning analysis and conflict prevention. In this regard, the AU has built up a formidable structure for prevention and peace-making. These include the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, Special Envoys, and ad hoc mediation panels, often comprised of sitting and former Heads of State. The AU also has experience in deploying liaison offices and "special political missions" in countries at risk of, or emerging from, conflict (AU, 2016a). The Commission has focused on operational conflict prevention with regular Horizon Scanning briefings provided to the AUPSC on potential threats and emerging peace and security challenges on the continent; production of early warning reports and the conduct of preventive diplomacy missions in Member States at risk of conflict. The Commission has also continued to provide technical assistance to Member States in the establishment and strengthening of national infrastructures for peace, including early warning systems and Situation Rooms (AU, 2016a). In the context of post-conflict reconstruction and support of countries, the Commission deploys mission to assess the priority needs of the country in need.



These include identification of joint activities in support of implementation of peace agreements in Member States emerging from conflict; conducting needs assessment missions; consolidating and scaling up security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration initiatives; technical and operational support to control the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and sustained collaboration with RECs/RMs and civil society organizations (Walensteen & Anders, 2014). The engagements have also been geared towards developing and implementing Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and Peace Strengthening Projects (PSPs) in areas of deployment of AU Peace Support Operations, and through the AU Liaison Offices.

The AU Commission also provides strategic, political, technical, and planning support to operations authorized by the Peace and Security Council and carried out by regional coalitions of Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), or Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RMs). Such support includes: The Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) and the operation against Boko Haram undertaken by the Lake Chad Basin Commission and Benin-the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). There has been significant innovation and creative problem solving, which has been pivotal in meeting the continent's peace and security challenges.

Ulf Engel and J. Gomes Porto focuses on the internal dynamics of the African continent. Their book provides an informed and critical analysis of the operationalization and institutionalization of the APSA. Engel and Porto (2010) argued that the political, institutional and normative processes that underpin the transformation of the OAU into the AU have the potential to transform the way the continent addresses the challenges of security. However, they assume there are many risks and the implementation and successful actualization of the APSA are not assured. They also revealed that there are at least three related

challenges why the APSA is not fully successful. Firstly, the individual interest of member states which contradicts the norms agreed upon and can hinder APSA's institutional development. Secondly, the continuing violation by several member states of fundamental human principle such as the sanctity of human life and respect of human rights, democratic practices and good governance, rule of law and protection of fundamental freedom raises the question of whose security is actually being in practice, protected. Thirdly, the institutionalization of the APSA has evidenced serious capacity deficits. A substantial number of member states continue not to meet their financial obligations thus increasing the organization's dependency on external aid and also raising the issues of sustainability. Brosig (2012) talks about the creation of the AU. He outlines the concept of Non-indifference that the AU has embraced. He also highlights the APSA's institutional Instruments and its challenges. In his work, the author identifies four challenges of the APSA. Firstly, the issues of dispersed ownership constitute the first challenge. Secondly, the unfinished or vague security is also a challenge of the APSA. Thirdly, the policy doctrines is also considered as challenges. And the scarce resources constitute the fourth challenge of the APSA. He argues that these challenges hinder the AU from attaining its goals. According to the author, in order to attain these goals, there is a need to create decentralized governance structures and an integrative leadership style. He added that the AU needs collective efforts to achieve its objectives. Malte Brosig argues that since 2002, the AU has been intervened in many African conflicts. Nevertheless, after ten years of being under construction, the peace and security institutions of the Union have achieved not much. Notwithstanding the challenges of the APSA, it is considered as the foremost and recognized African institution for the resolution of conflicts.

According to George Mukundi Wachira in his article for the Norwegian institute of international affairs, the APSA was founded in 2002 during the transformation



of the OAU into AU. It addresses the AU's peace and security agenda. However, despite significant gains in conflict resolutions in Africa continues to face persistent political challenges such as its static approach of consent-based intervention; the prominent role of non-state actors in conflicts; over reliance on external partners for funding, limited political will to undertake early preventive action as well as continuing influence of external factors in shaping the dynamics of security challenges in Africa (Wachira, 2017).

Lins de Albuquerque (2016) analyses the current status of the African security structure, with a particular focus on discussing remaining challenges within the central institutions that compose APSA. The report concludes that the greatest impediment to the continued development of APSA is funding. Relying so heavily on international donors is inherently risky, an issue of which the AU is very much aware of and is taking active steps to remedy. The author states that the rapid deployment capability of the ASF is the key to the notion of finding an "African solution to African problems". After a detailed writing on the ASPA and its Adriana Albuquerque further wrote that this is because it is intended to give the AU military capability to deploy at short notice to prevent war crimes against humanity, rather than having to be at the mercy of the international community deciding to take action.

Besada et al (2010) provides an overview of the peace and security challenges facing the African continent, with topics ranging from integration methods, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), and responsibility to protect (R2P) to peace building, peacekeeping, and the APSA. Regarding African solutions for African problems, the authors argue that difficult security problems, be they practical or normative in kind, require complex solutions. Concerning the hope and challenges for the APSA, the authors provide a short overview of the APSA mechanisms and point to the encouraging decrease in the number of wars and greater prosperity and stability many States in the region have

shown. They note that progress has been made. However, they argue that the lack of State capacity, coordination, resources, and the AU's unwillingness to confront fellow leaders among others, means that Africa has not operationalized its peace and security architecture. They recommended integration between the AU and UN as the way forward for the AU.

Cilliers and Guanguenon wrote that since its creation, the APSA has faced a threefold challenge: the need to develop effective institutional mechanisms that are able to respond to Africa's multiple security challenges; The need for adequate resources to find these mechanisms and their ever-expanding mandate; the challenges of coordination of its actions at the regional level with the UN and external actors (Cillers & Guanguenon, 2016).

Birkit Tiruneh wrote that most issues of the APSA are related to the decision-making ability and political willingness of member states which are decisive factors for successful early warning. He further states that the CEWS is not politically astute and its analysis should be informed by sound political judgement. The slow response is caused by lack of proper coordination and functioning between the regional organizations and the AU (Birkit, 2010).

Powell (2005) argues that the AU's emerging security architecture places the continental organization within a robust security system consisting of African regional arrangements, United Nations (UN), and other key members of the international community. Yet there are a number of challenges confronting African regional organizations and their efforts to fulfil a peace and security mandate. Some of these challenges are questionable legitimacy, resource and capacity constraints, and conflicting political agendas. She wrote that Political initiatives to prevent, manage, and resolve conflict need to be matched with strategies on the part of national, regional and international actors to address the social and political vulnerabilities at the root of conflict.

Abass analyses the relevance of the APSA in realising human security within the continent. He underscores the





importance of the relationship between the AU and RECs/SRMs and notes that the ability of these organization to maintain peace and security rests upon their aptitude to operationalize the African Peace and Security Architecture. In his analysis, Abass highlights some of the major challenges faced by the regional economic communities and/or sub-regional mechanisms and provides concrete suggestions on how best a collaborative effort between these and the African Union could be made effective in the protection of human security in Africa. In his conclusion, he cautions the African Union on its fast-paced adoption of treaties ‘as though there was a medal for quantity’ and suggests that the AU has, at this critical moment, a ‘historical role to play in protecting human security in Africa (Abass, 2010).

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The APSA embraces a comprehensive agenda for peace and security in Africa that includes:

- Peace-making, peace support operations, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction and development. (APSA report, 2012)

Within state and interstate violent and additional intimidations to peace and security remain to challenge the African continent and will not hesitate last to fix so in this epoch. It has gotten indescribable sufferings to the continent as an entirety. Several security motivations have failed to return the anticipated effects. The continent mega politicians have derived to the practice that without Africa sets in place the suitable operative actions and ways to prevent, manage and alleviate encounters further extremely than ever before, the continent could remain to stand the terrible effects of conflicts. (Yayew, 2019).

Based on the literature review on the theme APSA Institutional Challenges and Its Preparedness to address interstate conflicts in West Africa, there are different opinions and arguments about the general challenges of the APSA which hinders this body to perform one of its primary roles and also the challenges of peace building. These various authors provide great insight into the institutional framework and the challenges that face the APSA. From these papers, one can appreciate the extent to which these challenges can impact the APSA’s ability to effectively perform its role Wachira (2017). Again, scholars like Powell (2005); Cillers (2008); Besada, Goetz and Werner (2016); Engel and Porto (2010) have stated that the challenges of the APSA stems from the lack of capacity, the design and structure of the APSA which can be seen in the conflicting political agendas of member states, individual interest of states and the lack of coordination and engagement between the AU and the five regions. The absence of a decentralized governance structure and an integrated leadership style and effective institutional mechanisms that are able to respond to Africa’s multiple security challenges. Birkit (2010) wrote that the decision making and the sparse willingness showed by member states constitute the challenges of the APSA.



Many of the scholars such as Engel and Porto (2010); Brosig (2012); Besada, Goetz and Werner (2016); Cillers (2008); Lins de Albuquerque (2016); Powell (2005) share the same view that one of the greatest challenges of the APSA over the years in resources, the structure has greatly suffered from inadequate funding by member states and most times have been made to rely on external funding. A very large number of member states continue not to meet their financial obligations thus increasing the organization's dependency on external aid and also raising the issues of sustainability. Brosig (2012); Cillers & Guanguenon (2016); Powell (2005); Wachira (2017) argue that the policy, doctrines and dispersed ownership which enables continuing influence of external factors in shaping the dynamics of security challenges in Africa form part of the problem.

However, in the existing literatures, many of the scholars failed to mention or include West Africa as a region in their study because they looked at the general challenges of the APSA in Africa, therefore leaving the question of the APSA and the challenges of counter insurgency in West Africa unanswered.

### **Methodology**

Documentary method was used in this study to gather data from secondary sources on the structure of the African Peace and Security Architectural (APSA) and its effectiveness to counter insurgency in West Africa.

Qualitative analysis was used in analyzing the data collected.

### **Structure of the African Peace and Security Architectural (APSA) and Counter Insurgency in West Africa**

The African Peace and Security Architecture is the operational structure in the AU, which has the assignment to ensure the effective implementation of decisions regarding post-conflict reconstruction, peace-building, conflict prevention, peace support operations, peace-making and interventions (Dersso, 2012). It is described as a complex of structure, norms, procedure and capacities to

assist the AU in carrying out tasks within the fields of security and peace. Others describe the African peace and security architecture as a system of institutions, policies and norms (Cilliers & Gnanguênon, 2016). The APSA consists of two components, the policy and normative component and the institutional component in the form of the peace and Security Council. The normative and policy component have two fundamental frameworks. The first is concerned with the redefinition of the principle of state sovereignty, while the second framework deals with the engagement to an interventionist security and peace regime.

The main pillar of the APSA is the PSC, which is supported, in the discharge of its mandate, by various structures, namely: The Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund. The relationship between the African Union (AU), which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa, and the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RECs/RMs) is a key APSA component.

Peace and Security Council (PSC) came out of series of discussions to reform the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR). The PSC Protocol was signed in 2002 and it became operational in 26 December 2003. From 2004 to March 2009, the PSC had held over 180 meetings. It also delivered over 100 communiqués and pronounced sanctions against some African states such as Togo, Madagascar, Mauritania, and Guinea. Additionally, some peace operations were authorised in countries such as the Comoros (three times), Somalia and Sudan (William, 2009). The PSC is a key element of the APSA. It is also the most visible component. The PSC was created to be an early warning instrument for timely and effective response to emergent conflict and crisis situations in Africa.



Panel of the Wise is composed of five highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made an outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent. The main function of the Panel is to support the PSC and Chairperson of the AU Commission on matters relating to preventive diplomacy. The mandate of the Panel is to be supportive and advisory of the efforts of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the PSC in the areas of conflict prevention. The Panel is also required to support and advise on the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa (Jegede, 2009). The most direct contribution of the Panel in matters of preventive diplomacy has been to alert the PSC and Chairperson of the AU Commission to the importance of certain thematic issues. This is done through the publication of reports. To date, the Panel has written thematic reports on election-related violence, fighting impunity, women and children in armed conflict, and democratisation and governance. The Panel has worked towards accomplishing this aim since it was inaugurated in 2007 by focusing on three main activities. These are firstly, to advise the AU Commission on security and peace challenges. Secondly, it has advised the Commissioner of the Peace and Security Department within the AU. Thirdly, the Panel has carried out fact-finding missions in countries in conflict and performed shuttle diplomacy. Additionally, the Panel has contributed to share best practices and experiences through an annual forum for African mediators and envoys (Khadiagala, 2016).

African Standby Force (ASF) consists of an African Rapid Intervention Force. The force is a vital element of the APSA. The ASF is deployed under authorization of the PSC. The ASF function on three different levels: the continental, sub-regional and national levels. The continental level refers to the AU Commission and its planning elements, the sub-regional refers to the five brigades that is to be readied and stationed in the various sub-regions for deployment and the national refers to troop

contributing countries. The ASF faces a lot of challenges that are technical and political in nature. The ASF is a military venture. It, therefore, entails high levels of cooperation among Africa countries, which is presently missing. In fact, cooperation is essential for the rapid deployment of troops when it is needed.

The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) collects information on a multitude of variables related to conflict outbreak in AU member states, analyses this information and brings its findings to the attention of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, who then briefs the PSC. The overall goal of CEWS reporting is to give early warning about situations that could escalate to armed conflict, thereby giving the PSC the information needed to act preventatively. Although CEWS has developed substantially since its creation in 2002, experts suggest that two core issues are currently limiting its effectiveness. First, only the western REC ECOWAS, the eastern REC the East African Community (EAC), and partly the southern REC SADC are currently connected to CEWS, thus limiting the system's ability to obtain information related to key conflict variables across the continent. Second, and perhaps more importantly, there is disconnect between early warning and early response

Peace Fund. The aim of the Peace Fund is to collect financial resources to finance operational activities in the context of security and peace such as, peace support missions. The Peace Fund successfully collected 41% of its 2016 total budget, hence, 59 % of the AU budget depended on foreign financial aid (Cilliers & Gnanguenon, 2016).

AU Commission. The commission is a continuation of the OAU General secretariat and its main function is to support and represents the interests of the Executive Council and AU Assembly. The commission works closely with the AU by drafting common positions of the organisation, managing the resources and budget of the AU, in addition to implement decisions of the AU organs and initiate proposals to be submitted in the different organs. it coordinates and harmonizes the AU policies and programs





with the Regional Economic Communities' programs and policies. The AU Assembly elects the Chairperson and deputy chairperson, while the Executive Council elects eight commissioners, which complete the decision makers in the commission. All members are elected for a period of four years and can only be renewable once (African Union Handbook, 2018)

### **Challenges of the pillars of the APSA.**

Asides the general challenges of the institution, the pillars of the APSA also face challenges which has hindered their effective delivering of their mandates. After the formation of the panel of the wise, many people argued the need and importance of the pillar. The limit of membership of the Panel is unhelpful considering the level and spontaneity of conflicts and crises in Africa. The limitation of the Panel's membership to five raised the concern that five members may not be able to respond adequately to every situation requiring attention or intervention. By comparison, the Council of Elders of ECOWAS has a whole list of eminent African personalities that it can call upon. Besides the fact that an expanded membership to either 10 or 15 (since each of the five regions needs to be equally represented) will make it more challenging to coordinate meetings and other activities, the Panel does not exclude the possibility of calling upon other personalities if it is not able to respond to a situation itself. One questions the rationale behind such prescription on a continent richly endowed with dignified personalities who can make a difference in addressing conflicts and crisis situations. Although the modalities of the Panel allow for support by mediation teams, this does not remove the need for a broader membership of the Panel. This is because, more than any other mechanism in the system, the assets of the Panel and its potential to make a mark in the peace and security architecture lie in the moral force of its respected personalities (Khadiagala, 2008).

Equally, given the distinct feature of the art of mediation which requires disputants' consent on who

mediates over their disputes (Ury, 1991). It is difficult to imagine how a five-member panel can effectively satisfy this requirement within the African conflict context. An example that vividly describes this concern is the Kenya election crisis. The government, in the wake of the crisis, had offered dialogue which was to be facilitated by the Ghanaian President who was also the Chairperson of the AU. Mr Ralia Odinga, the leader of the opposition, however, insisted that he would only agree to a mediation facilitated by international mediators (BBC News, 2008). The impasse was eventually brokered by a team of international mediators headed by the former Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), Mr Kofi Annan, a non-member of the Panel (Skye News, 2008).

Another challenge exists in terms of the Panel's mandate, which require clarification. It is not certain whether the Panel can intervene in the disputes involving states who, though members of the AU, have not ratified the PSC Protocol. Argument can be made in support of the proposition that the Panel can and that such position should be adopted in its manner of operation. A reason for this is that, although article 22 of the PSC provides for ratification by a simple majority of the member states before entering into force, the PSC Protocol seems different from other African Protocols. These other Protocols include the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act (Amendment Protocol) and the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament.

According to Cillers (2005), early warning needs to consist of more than just the timely provision and sharing of relevant information. Beyond the collection and verification of information relevant to the mitigation and prevention of violent conflict, early warning requires the analysis of that information and the formulation and communication of analysis and policy options to relevant end-users. At the continental level, the end-users are the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, the Peace and Security Council and other relevant policy



organs of the AU and the PSC. In this sense, the aim of early warning is to strengthen the capacity of the Commission, the PSC and structures such as the Panel of the Wise to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent response strategies can be formulated to either prevent violent conflict or limit its destructive effects.

Early warning is a precondition for timely response and, therefore, also for the development of the political will to respond – although the provision of early warning in itself is an insufficient precondition to effect response. Although CEWS has developed substantially since its creation in 2002, experts suggest that two core issues are currently limiting its effectiveness. First, only the western REC ECOWAS, the eastern REC the East African Community (EAC), and partly the southern REC SADC are currently connected to CEWS, thus limiting the system's ability to obtain information related to key conflict variables across the continent. Second, and perhaps more importantly, there is a disconnect between early warning and early response (Nathan et al, 2015). For example, CEWS staff claim they gave an early warning about the outbreak of conflict in Mali and Guinea-Bissau in 2012, but that the PSC nevertheless decided not to take any preventative action based on this information (Noyes and Yarwood, 2013). The reason for failing to act in these cases was allegedly related to a lack of political will to intervene in the internal matters of member states and the PSC's preference for reaching decisions by consensus. With regard to CEWS, further development of the current system is likely to have little effect on crisis prevention, since AU member states most often lack the political will to act preventatively. This results in them instead being more or less forced to engage in conflict management using military means when crises have escalated to armed conflicts, a much more challenging task.

Analyzing the challenges of the African Standby Force, one of the major issues in the construction of the ASF is the vagueness surrounding its implementation

beyond the underlying principles that frame it. This is particularly significant in East Africa, where mistrust is the central characteristic of relations between States, which profoundly influenced the development of the East African Standby Force (EASF). Security developments in the region – and namely the lessons learned from AMISOM – are instructive with regard to the ASF implementation and to challenges of military coordination between the AU and EASF. The lack of political will demonstrated by States within the AU, with regards to issues of peace and security, is materialized in particular by the lethargy plaguing its military staff committee which makes its revitalization a necessity for the sustainability of APSA.

Furthermore, it is argued that the mandate of the ASF is far too ambitious to be realistic considering the resources available. In particular, resources have been lacking to develop the rapid deployment capability outlined in the ASF scenarios. The rapid deployment capability of the ASF is key to the notion of finding an “African solution to African problems”. This is because it is intended to give the AU the military capability to deploy at short notice to prevent war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity, rather than having to be at the mercy of the international community deciding to take action. Rapid deployment capability is the critical capability that has been lacking from the ASF to date. This is preventing the ASF from performing the most challenging mission scenarios (Lins de Albuquerque, 2016).

There are still not sufficient troops or equipment to deal with a situation in which “there is no peace to keep”. Many peace-keepers have perished under these conditions. The African Mission in Somalia has suffered a similar fate in which far less than the 8000 troops pledged actually arriving (Kastler and Liepert, 2008). Vines and Middleton (2008) identified some of the difficulties that will transpire with the African Standby Force which include inability to raise sufficient troops; limited intervention mandates; ability to pay troops on time; lack of command structures for effective decision making for



example, the death of Nigerian head at MSC left a vacuum that is yet to be filled; large reliance on a few countries; and lack of equipment, especially airlifting ability. For Pabst (2008), logistics, finance, capacity building and complimentary military forces are what would be required for the ASF to function effectively.

Practically, however, rapid deployment capacity for the ASF will remain out of reach for the foreseeable future. The primary reason for this is that the logistics component of rapid deployment capacity is lacking. The most serious logistics problem is the lack of strategic airlift, without which troops cannot be moved with the speed needed for rapid deployment (De Conin, 2014). Having said that, the ASF still has the capacity to deploy for several other types of missions, demonstrating that this conflict management tool has already served an important role in managing conflict on the continent (Walter, 2015). Evidently, the structure of the APSA has seriously hindered the organization carrying out very important counter insurgency operations in West Africa. Again, the faulty structure of the architecture is responsible for many other challenges the APSA has even until present time ranging from funding, lack of political will, default in obligations etc. Hence, this study has shown that the structure of the African Peace and Security Architecture undermined counter insurgency in West Africa between 2011 to 2020.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

One of the major obstacles for African peace and development was and still is, the proliferation of armed conflicts, both inter-state and intrastate, insurgency and terrorism mostly rooted in the religious and cultural beliefs of certain group. Throughout these years the causes of these conflicts has changed as a result of political and social alterations. However, the lack of political capability and democratic culture contributed to subsequent social problems and unrest, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. This led to a weakening of the States, to the emergence of alternative forms of power and to ethnical conflicts across

national borders. The African Peace and security council has over the years attained some measure of success but it is still battling lots of factors hindering it from achieving a lot more.

On the basis of the findings, the investigation combined with an analysis of the interregional coordination within the African Union indicated, several contributory causes to why the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture is not fully functioning yet. These causes were lack of will from the different member states, weak coordination among the member states. All these causes point to structural defects that has been a major issue of the APSA and has over time metamorphosed into these other challenges.

Based on the finding, the study recommends that the structure of the APSA should be reviewed and a new structure should be put in place with regards to the current crises facing the continent. That way the crises prevention and management programmes will be tailored to suit the present day crises which have over the years moved from intra state to inter-state. This will provide effective and smooth running of the APSA and all its pillars and also help deal with the other challenges the APSA face.

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