Hart On Problems Of Legal Reasoning: Implication For Legal Theory
Ngozi Chukwuemeka Aja Ph.D
Senior Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, University of Port Harcourt Rivers State, Nigeria.
Keywords: Implication, Legal, Problem, Reasoning, Theory
Abstract
This paper adopted the textual analytical method of philosophical research in articulating the implication Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart’s views on problems of legal reasoning have for legal theory. The analysis of Hart showed he located the problem of legal reasoning in the misconceptions of the in determinacy of legal rules by the legal formalist and the rule skeptic. He presented them as extreme positions that make legal reasoning either mechanical or arbitrary, thereby rendering it inapt for adequate dispensation of justice. His argument is that indeterminacy of legal rules only points to lacuna in enacted law, which according to him, is inevitable giver that rules are framed in human language with its indefinite reference. He argued that indeterminacy of legal rules only calls for rejuvenation of enacted legal rules with extralegal factors such as moral principles and public policy. This, he stated, could be achieved with judicial discretion being an essential aspect of legal reasoning. Hart thereby initiated the unifying tenet of ‘soft’, ‘inclusive’ and ‘methodological’ positivism that moral principles could bind legal decisions in situations indeterminacy of legal rules. His position renders unacceptable accounts of legal reasoning based on ‘hard’, ‘exclusive’ and ‘substantive’ positivism, which have as their central tenet the claim that moral principles cannot bind court decisions. The challenge this paper through Hart, throws up to legal theory is continual development of theories of legal reasoning that accommodates judicial discretion and ways of enhancing it in other to achieve proper and adequate dispensation of justice.