Academic Journal of Current Research
Vol.6, No.7, July-2019;
ISSN (2343 – 403X);
p –ISSN 3244 – 5621
Impact factor: 7.91

THE IMPERATIVE OF REGIONAL COOPERATION IN OIL AND GAS RESOURCES GOVERNANCE IN THE GULF OF GUINEA: INTERROGATING MARITIME ORGANIZATION OF WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA'S INITIATIVES

Allens Umunna Iheonu, Ph.D, Bitrus Micheal and Okorie Albert, Ph.D
Department of Government and Public Administration, Abia State University, Uturu
Department of Political Science , Adamawa State University , Mubi
Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka

Abstract: The article examines the nexus between regional cooperation and resource governance in the Gulf of Guinea. The paper thus argues that the quest to secure the Gulf of Guinea for uninterrupted oil and gas exploration informed the establishment of Maritime Organization of West Africa (MOWCA). This was followed by several initiatives by the body; the paper noted that member states cooperation is vital in addressing insecurity that has undermined oil and gas production in the region. The study adopted the integration theory as framework of analysis. Documentary method and content analysis were used for data collection and analysis. The study found that illegal exploration of oil and gas in the region coupled with piracy and armed robbery are major challenges that should be solved, since these problems were systematically created by non-state actors that have interest in the region. To this end, the study recommended that the Gulf of Guinea states under regional organization such as MOWCA should encourage and adopt massive security initiatives to suppress piracy and armed robbery, so as to harness full economic and political potentials of the region among others

Keyword: Regional Cooperation, Gulf of Guinea, Oil and Gas Explorations, Resource Governance, Integration Theory.

Introduction

The Gulf of Guinea is a large area of the African continent encompassing 20 coastal states which are: Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo endowed with abundance natural and economic resources throughout history. There are also five land-locked states who have signed as members of maritime organization of west and central state MOWCA, which are: Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Mali, and Niger. All of the member states are members of the African Union (AU).

Academic Journal of Current Research
Vol.6, No.7, July-2019;
ISSN (2343 – 403X);
p –ISSN 3244 – 5621
Impact factor: 7.91

Map of the Gulf of Guinea



Source: Encyclopedia Encarta (2014)

The region is regarded as a hot spot for the world's minerals, oil and gas exploration with other renewable marine resources such as fish, crustaceans, mollusks and algae which are drawing interest (Delano, 2009). There is a growing recognition of the fact that the vast economic potential associated with the Gulf of Guinea is fast being eroded due to increasing insecurity, (Kwaja, 2010). The growing recognition of the fact that the vast economic resources associated with the Gulf of Guinea is to be protected with adequate maritime security strategies such

Academic Journal of Current Research
Vol.6, No.7, July-2019;
ISSN (2343 – 403X);
p –ISSN 3244 – 5621
Impact factor: 7.91

as the MOWCA initiative on sub regional integrated coast guard network, a center for information and communication, a transit facilitation and "sealed grid" system, a regional maritime fund in west and central Africa; and the joint patrol between Nigeria and Benin Republic in other to enhance security especially in their joint development zone, (Mane,2005).

The economic and trade activities in the Gulf of Guinea has been characterized with insecurity indices such as piracy, oil theft, proliferation of small arms and light weapon, drug and human trafficking, illegal fishing (poaching), and poverty, but international agencies, regional, state, maritime stakeholders, and scholars have all expressed opinion on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea which has not yielded the desired result, (Soares de Oliveira, 2007). Over the years, the region has engaged in a lot of workshops, symposia and conferences as a result of the various governance and security strategies initiated for the economic development of the region.

Resources management and efficiency in the Gulf of Guinea is a major reason for international, regional, and state maritime security strategies and framework so as to improve the exploitation and exploration economic resources in the region, (Kwaja , 2011). The UN Resolution 2018 and 2039, adopted in 2011 and 2012 respectively, encourage States of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), through concerted action, to counter unhealthy exploration of economic resources in the Gulf of Guinea conducting bilateral or regional maritime patrols consistent with relevant international law and to develop and implement national and regional maritime security strategies, (UNEP,2009). As mentioned earlier, the traditional land-centric approach to security in the sub-region contributed to a systemic neglect of maritime forces in both absolute and relative terms. It is therefore, not surprising that state in the Gulf of Guinea has failed due to corruption, lack of political will, weak naval forces and lack of laid down policy framework especially as it concern the management of economic resources and maritime security framework in the Gulf of Guinea. Young Oran (2007) remarked that the cooperation of the Gulf of Guinea States in terms of managing their natural resources and the environment in general has not achieved the desired result. The activities of non-state actors and their interest is driven by a combination of greed or corruption that holds various strands to security in the region. Drawing from the foregoing this study becomes imperative as it examined the nexus between regional cooperation and resources governance in the Gulf of Guinea.

Theoretical Underpinnings of the Study

Integration theory provided the theoretical basis this study is anchored. The development of the theory is linked to Hans (1958); Linderg (1963) and Schmitter (1969) among others. Integration theory refers to a framework used in international relations and political science to analyze and understand the process of regional integration. It seeks to explain how and why states come together to form regional organizations or systems, and how those organizations evolve over time. At its core, integration theory examines the political, economic, and social interactions among states within a specific region. It explores the motivations, mechanisms, and consequences of regional integration, as well as the factors that influence the success or failure of integration efforts. There are several key concepts and approaches within integration theory: functionalism, neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, constructivism and historical institutionalism.

Integration theory proposes several key ideas and propositions regarding the process and dynamics of regional integration. These propositions provide a foundation for understanding the dynamics, drivers, and challenges of regional integration. They guide researchers and policymakers in analyzing and assessing the processes and outcomes of regional integration efforts across different regions of the world. These basic propositions are:

- Regional integration is a gradual process.
- Integration is driven by shared interests and goals.
- Functional cooperation leads to spill-over effects.
- National governments play a central role.
- Ideas and norms shape integration.
- Historical context matters.
- Integration faces challenges and obstacles.
- Integration outcomes vary.

Academic Journal of Current Research
Vol.6, No.7, July-2019;
ISSN (2343 – 403X);
p –ISSN 3244 – 5621
Impact factor: 7.91

Regional integration in the Gulf of Guinea has had significant impacts on the governance of oil and gas resources in the region. Integration theory provides a useful framework for understanding these impacts by considering the motivations, mechanisms, and consequences of regional integration. One key aspect of integration theory is the recognition that regional integration can arise from shared interests and goals. In the case of the Gulf of Guinea, the countries in the region, such as Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon, share a common interest in maximizing the benefits of their oil and gas resources. These countries have recognized that working together in a regional context can enhance their collective bargaining power and lead to improved governance and management of these resources.

The functionalist perspective within integration theory suggests that integration often starts with functional cooperation in specific areas. In the Gulf of Guinea, this can be seen through the establishment of regional organizations such as the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) , Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and MOWCA. These organizations have facilitated cooperation and coordination among member states in the governance of oil and gas resources, including the sharing of best practices, information exchange, and joint initiatives to combat illegal activities such as oil theft and piracy.

Neofunctionalism, an extension of functionalism, argues that functional cooperation can create spill-over effects in other areas. In the Gulf of Guinea, successful cooperation in oil and gas governance can lead to spill-over effects in the form of increased cooperation in other sectors, such as energy infrastructure development, environmental protection, and the promotion of regional economic integration. For instance, the Gulf of Guinea countries have pursued joint initiatives to develop regional infrastructure, such as pipelines and refineries, to optimize the utilization of oil and gas resources and enhance energy security in the region.

Moreover, the establishment of regional institutions and legal frameworks is an important aspect of integration theory. In the Gulf of Guinea, regional organizations such as the GGC, MOWCA and ECCAS have developed legal frameworks, protocols, and agreements to guide the governance of oil and gas resources. These include regulations on exploration and production, revenue sharing mechanisms, and environmental standards. The existence of such regional legal frameworks strengthens governance practices, ensures consistency in policies, and provides a platform for dispute resolution among member states.

Another impact of regional integration on oil and gas governance in the Gulf of Guinea is in the realm of political integration. Political integration, as highlighted in integration theory, involves decision-making processes and cooperation among member states. In the context of the Gulf of Guinea, political integration has led to the establishment of platforms for dialogue and decision-making, where member states can discuss issues related to the governance and management of oil and gas resources. This facilitates coordination, consensus-building, and the adoption of collective strategies for sustainable development and equitable distribution of benefits.

Conclusively, integration theory helps explain the impacts of regional integration on oil and gas resources governance in the Gulf of Guinea. The shared interests and goals of member states, functional cooperation, spill-over effects, the establishment of regional institutions and legal frameworks, and political integration have all contributed to improved governance practices, enhanced cooperation, and sustainable management of oil and gas resources in the region.

Materials and Methods

The study adopted documentary and observation methods for data collection. Documentary method involves eliciting information from already existing documents. Thus enables us gather, investigate, categorize, interpret and identify the usefulness or otherwise of documents consulted as sources of data in the study. While observation method on the other hand is a process of watching and noting behaviour and events as they unfold in the environment of the study. In line with the above, the study essentially relied on and utilized relevant data from journals, special reports from United Nations, International Maritime Organization (IMO), UNEP, FES, among others. Content analysis was adopted for the interpretation of data generated in course of the study. This method involves

Academic Journal of Current Research
Vol.6, No.7, July-2019;
ISSN (2343 – 403X);
p –ISSN 3244 – 5621
Impact factor: 7.91

making inferences through objective and systematic identification of specific characteristics of a message. In addition, figures and tables were equally used where necessary to further enhance the clarity of the analysis.

The Exploration of Oil and Gas in the Gulf of Guinea

In Prior to the discovery and exploration of oil and gas in the region, the state in the region had grown and sustained their economy through agriculture. The Gulf of Guinea, located off the coast of West Africa and extending from the eastern coast, past Nigeria to the Gabon estuary, is fast emerging as an important region because of its land ward and its maritime domains. It is rich in oil, gas and other economic resources which go hand in hand during exploration and its large population offers a potential market.

The Gulf of Guinea spans the Atlantic littoral, including territories in West, Central and Southern Africa. The international priority accorded to energy security brings considerable world-wide attention to the important hydrocarbons, including oil and gas resources in the region. With the exception of Chad and Sudan, all oil producing state in Sub- Saharan Africa are located in the Gulf of Guinea. These states include Angola, Cameroon, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and Sao Tome and Principe. Mahler in FES (2011) remarked that oil is the most strategic resource in world economy and world politics. As of 2008, oil constituted one third of global energy consumption, clearly before other energy resources such as natural gas, coal and uranium. In simple words: the world economy, particularly the industrialized countries, cannot do without oil.

The problem associated with oil and gas was summarized by Soares de Oliveira in his book "Oil Politics in the Gulf of Guinea" (2006) under "Resource curse" Depending on the institutional context, resource wealth and its wider impact can be controlled and managed. How can we reconcile these theoretical conclusions with the sad reality in the Gulf of Guinea? Many of the natural resource-exporting countries in this region have disastrous development records as measured by human development indicators. Soares de Oliveira argues that the Gulf of Guinea is the "worst-case scenario" among resource wealthy states:

Every structural prerequisite is missing for sound use of oil revenues; severe pathologies already characterized the politics of many states before the arrival of oil rents, and most of their economies were already fragile and badly run; and what could go wrong with decision making did go wrong. Oil has exacerbated previous shortcomings and created new ones. Soares de Oliveira (2006:83)

The inability to reconcile these abundant resources with economic growth has been the problem associated with the Gulf of Guinea state based on the oil curse perspective.

Appealing for international cooperation: At the 2008 G8 summit in Japan, President Yar'Adua spoke forcefully about the problem of illicit bunkering, saying stolen oil fuels conflict much the same way that illicit diamonds fueled conflict in other African countries such as Sierra Leone in recent years, even calling it "blood oil". Providing a breakdown of oil and gas operations in the region, Madueke (2013) noted that the Gulf of Guinea consists of 15 countries with oil production exceeding 5.4 million barrels per day in 2012 stressing that oil supply from the Gulf of Guinea region in 2011 was equivalent to 27 percent of EU consumption and 29% of total US petroleum consumption in the same year why Nigeria and Angola account for 47% and 34% of total Gulf of Guinea oil supply respectively. Collectively, Gulf of Guinea countries produce more than five million barrels of oil per day, (Uediale, 2013). But Africa accounts for 8 percent of the world's proven reserves of natural gas, of which one quarter is located in the Gulf of Guinea, mane (2005). Due to its vast oil and gas among other resources, this region has become a vital arena for strategic and geopolitical competition. Crude oil is one of the world's most important strategic resources, and Africa has attracted a lot of attention among corporate and political decision-makers because of growing global oil demand, (Frynas & Paulo, 2007). The United States certainly recognizes the potential of the Gulf of Guinea to meet and fill part of its excess demand for energy. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is providing assistance in the design and implementation of a regional regulatory framework aimed at controlling the exploration of natural

Academic Journal of Current Research
Vol.6, No.7, July-2019;
ISSN (2343 – 403X);
p –ISSN 3244 – 5621
Impact factor: 7.91

gas as well as generation of electricity in Ghana and Nigeria. In the same vein, the U.S. Export-Import Bank has financed an off- and onshore natural gas pipeline, the West Africa Gas Pipeline (WAGP), which is 1,000 kilometers long and is intended to transport natural gas from Nigeria to Benin, Togo, and Ghana. The WAGP project, which has required an initial investment of $500 million, will contribute to promoting regional trade of an essential and abundant commodity in the sub-region and is likely to stimulate growth of new industries in the four countries.

The discovery and production of oil and gas by some states in the region endowed with these economic resources has been engulfed with conflict according to (Basedau & Mahler 2010), but put differently, oil and gas production has necessitated security concerns for onward production. Table one below shows oil and gas trends in some of the Gulf of Guinea states

.

Table 1: Oil and Gas Potentials of Some Gulf of Guinea States

Country	Year of first oil and gas discovery	Year of first production	Oil reserves in 2009 (in billion bare(s)	Crude oil production in 2011 (in 1000 bpd)	Reserves to production ratio (in years)
Angola	1955	1956	9.0	1,906.4	12.9
Benin Republic	1968	1982	0.0	0.0	0.0
Cameroon	1955	1978	0.2	76.9	7.1
Congo DR	1970	1975	0.2	16.4	33.4
Congo Brazzaville	1951	1957	1.6	267.8	16.4
Cote d'Ivoire	1970s	Late 1970s	0.1	57.6	4.7
Equatorial Guinea	1991	1992	1.1	322.0	9.4
Gabon	1956	1957	2.0	242.1	22.6
Nigeria	1956	1958	36.2	2207.8	44.9

Source: Basedau & Mahler (2010).

There is growing search and exploration for oil and gas in the Gulf of Guinea by both coastal and land-locked states that have not discovered the economic rich resources which breed conflict and peace. There are many approaches that have been developed for the safety and management of oil and natural gas exploration and production operations in the Gulf of Guinea. These approaches are mostly initiated by regional bodies such as ECOWAS, ESCCA, GGC and MOWCA for integration and development in the region. According to Uediale (2013), the energy potential for the Gulf of Guinea region is astonishing. The region is host to 50.4 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and boasts the fastest rate of discovery of new reserves in the world. The discovery ratio for oil wells in the United States, for instance, is normally about ten percent, in West Africa the same ratio has been almost sixty percent. Experts predict according to Uediale that by 2020, Gulf of Guinea oil production will account for 25 percent of the global total, compared to twenty two percent from the Persian Gulf. The discovery of oil and gas deposits has increased the geostrategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea. It is currently the leading sub-Sahara African oil production region and home to the continent's main oil producing countries: Nigeria, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea. Its oil reserves are mainly offshore and can be exploited and exported along direct maritime routes towards the United States, Europe and Asia. As new discoveries are announced, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Côte d' Ivoire, Congo Brazzaville, Cameroon and Gabon are hoping to become or are already becoming big producers,

Academic Journal of Current Research
Vol.6, No.7, July-2019;
ISSN (2343 – 403X);
p –ISSN 3244 – 5621
Impact factor: 7.91

making the region an enormous oil and natural gas field, (Kwaja, 2011).

The Gulf of Guinea's coastal arc, which stretches over 6,000 kilometers from Senegal in West Africa through Cameroon in Central Africa to Angola in Southern Africa, underscores its value as an area of global geo-maritime importance as well as its vulnerable security if unattended and the region's vast economic potential could be eroded, however, due to growing insecurity. The first significant discovery of oil in Nigeria occurred in 1956 along the Niger Delta area why Oil on Benin's shelf was first discovered in 1967 in the Seme Field. Nigeria, realizing the value of its oil reserves, the government nationalized the oil industry in 1971 by creating a national oil company, now named the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), RAND corporation (2012). Nigeria is by far the leading gas producer and holds the largest gas reserves in sub-Sahara Africa. It is also an important exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG, second only to Algeria in Africa. Other countries in the Gulf of Guinea with non-negligible gas reserves include, in descending order, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea. A good infrastructure exists in the Gulf of Guinea to support the increased levels of exploration and production activities, notably in Nigeria. The historical levels of oil production in Nigeria have led to a network of onshore oil pipelines linking fields and the main oil refineries.

The challenges confronting the oil and gas sector are numerous, however according to Obasi in FES Report (2011) illicit oil bunkering, poor policy management, oil curse and volatility of oil prices in relation to dollars to the list. The prospects of the Gulf of Guinea are bright notwithstanding the numerous challenges. Today, outside the Persian Gulf region, one in four barrels of oil produced worldwide comes from the Gulf of Guinea, (Mane, 2005). In the near future, the latter will supply one-fifth of U.S. imported oil. In a longer-term perspective, the region's oil revenues will expand exponentially, although it is anticipated that production will decline in some countries, based on the capacity of currently available oil fields. Indeed, the seven largest oil-producing nations of the Gulf of Guinea are expected to generate more than $350 billion from this natural resource over the 2002-2019 period, which was more than the annual GDP of Russia ($310 billion in 2003) and close to the GDP of all sub-Sahara African countries combined as contended by Mane, (2005).

The expected oil and gas revenue of the Gulf of Guinea in the period ahead should be used as guarantee for foreign investors to develop activities in the region. This would in no circumstances be a pawn on future oil receipts by governments against budget support, an approach that has been misused in some of the oil-producing state of the region. Rather, it would induce private investors to commit and deliver funds for infrastructure and business investment.

Unresolved disputes, weak governance, and new sources of insecurity around the Southern and western Atlantic should prompt new patterns of security cooperation between both sides of the Atlantic Basin. In this respect, establishment of a new, broad-based and robust maritime security architecture that is comprehensive and the experiences of both Atlantic and non-Atlantic powers in supervising new security arrangements for the Atlantic would help in combating the numerous challenges in the maritime domain, (Kwaja, 2011).

According to IMO REPORT (2010), the meeting to progress the implementation of an integrated coast guard function network for West and Central African Countries, jointly organized by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA), and hosted by the Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA), was held in Accra, Ghana, from 13 to 17 December 2010, the meeting focused on the following five main objectives:

- To encourage all MOWCA coastal States to sign the Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of a sub-regional integrated coast guard network in West and Central Africa.
- Consistent with the MoU, to promote the implementation of coast guard functions across a wide range of activities, including the enhancement of maritime safety, security and environmental protection, law enforcement, and economic development.

Academic Journal of Current Research
Vol.6, No.7, July-2019;
ISSN (2343 – 403X);
p –ISSN 3244 – 5621
Impact factor: 7.91

- Consistent with the MoU, to establish and resource the coast guard coordinating centers.
- To review and develop short, medium and long-term strategies for implementation on both national and regional bases.
- To facilitate co-operation and coordination amongst participating States and potential sources of assistance and co-operation from international, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, Governments and private entities participating in the forum.

The main issues for discussion were as follows: Signature of the MoU; Maritime safety issues; Maritime security and law enforcement issues; Piracy and armed robbery against ships; Energy supply security; Legal frameworks; Sustainable development of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ); Technical challenges in the establishment of an integrated coast guard function network; Assistance and technical cooperation; and Funding issues.

In order to become a development zone, the Gulf of Guinea must be a haven of stability as put succinctly by (Gilpin, 2007).It should be regarded as a global common good. To this end, states in the region need to establish increased regional arrangements to safeguard peace, and internal and cross-border conflicts should be promptly resolved in line with what is being instituted at the African regional level. A credible and sustainable development of the region will also entail transparency, accountability, and reform. As regards the natural riches of the region, Mahler (2010) contended that it is critical to prevent the symptoms of "natural resource curse," while taking into account other regions' experience in dealing with natural resource booms, so as to ensure that the benefits from these riches are maintained over the very long term for the good of all.

Down Stream Production and Sub Regional Cooperation

The downstream sector involves the refining of crude oil and the processing of raw natural gas. It includes the selling and distribution of processed natural gas and the products derived from crude oil such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), gasoline (or petrol), jet fuel, diesel oil, other fuel oils, petroleum asphalt and petroleum coke. The downstream sector includes petroleum refineries, petroleum product distribution, retail outlets and natural gas distribution companies. The downstream stage in the production process involves processing the materials collected during the upstream stage into a finished product. The downstream stage further includes the actual sale of that product to other businesses, governments or private individuals.

The type of end user will vary depending on the finished product. Regardless of the industry involved, the downstream process has direct contact with customers through the finished product. Examples of Downstream Processes In the oil and gas industry, the downstream process consists of converting crude oil into other products and then selling those products to customers. Thus, oil refineries represent structures that operate within the downstream process. However, any kind of plant that processes raw materials may qualify as operating within the downstream stage of production.

The downstream sector commonly refers to the refining of petroleum crude oil and the processing and purifying of raw natural gas, as well as the marketing and distribution of products derived from crude oil and natural gas. Midstream operations are often included in the downstream category and considered to be a part of the downstream sector. The oil and gas operations that take place after the production phase, through to the point of sale. Downstream operations can include refining crude oil and distributing the by-products down to the retail level. By-products can include gasoline, natural gas liquids, diesel and a variety of other energy sources. Most large oil companies are known as being "integrated" because they combine upstream activities, which include exploration and production, with downstream operations. Some prefer to divide downstream operations into mid and downstream, with the refining process taking place midstream and the distribution occurring in the downstream phase. The Downstream sector of the oil industry is actually the one that provides the closest connection to everyday consumers. As such it is also perhaps the easiest of the three for many people to relate to. In the Downstream sector crude oil arrives at processing plants where it is refined and eventually turned into various products which will then be sold and distributed.

Academic Journal of Current Research
Vol.6, No.7, July-2019;
ISSN (2343 – 403X);
p –ISSN 3244 – 5621
Impact factor: 7.91

Obangame Express, sponsored by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), was designed to improve regional cooperation, maritime domain awareness, information-sharing practices and tactical interdiction expertise to enhance the collective capabilities of Gulf of Guinea nations to counter sea-based illicit activity, (Keeney, 2013). Through this exercise, we are continuing to expand those relationships, and to work collectively to maintain maritime security. Exercise Obangame Express, is one of four U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa- facilitated regional exercises. The exercise is part of a comprehensive strategy by U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. 6th Fleet and AFRICOM to provide collaborative opportunities amongst African forces and international partners that addresses maritime security concerns. The exercise sought to leverage the Code of Conduct for West and Central Africa, which provides a regional framework for cooperation and information sharing. Obangame Express, sponsored by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), was designed to improve regional cooperation, maritime domain awareness, information-sharing practices and tactical interdiction expertise to enhance the collective capabilities of Gulf of Guinea nations to counter sea-based illicit activity.

In the larger context, there is little historical precedent for international cooperation in this area. However, with the extreme paucity of operational capacity, this issue has time to develop, even with a strong desire to cooperate; MOWCA states must first put themselves into a situation where they were able to cooperate. However, the lack of conflict does not indicate effective inter-state cooperation, serviceable roads are lacking, especially between states, inter-state commercial air travel in Africa was until recently usually conducted via Paris. Ukonga, Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Gulf of Guinea Commission, hoped that meeting would result in an effective collaboration between the Security Council and the region. Recounting the history of the Commission and its Treaty, she said it aimed for cooperation in security, exploitation of resources and creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development in the region. The region was an important shipping hub as well as a source of hydrocarbon fuels, and it encompassed facilities that were the result of enormous investment, along with important ports. Both kinds of facilities were critical to the economies of the countries on the Gulf, as well as the landlocked countries that depended on coastal access (FES Report, 2011).

The Gulf was also an important route to other regions. National and transnational crimes if not checked, could have massive regional and international consequences. International cooperation with various actors and other regional and sub-regional organizations to prevent those consequences is very crucial. It was critical to harmonize refining and distribution laws in all the countries in the region, and MOWCA was active in that area. The need for international cooperation is essential because the resources required were clearly beyond the reach of any one country from the region. In addition, a region-wide approach was needed because a narrow approach would just move the problem to other areas. Technical expertise and equipment were also required, for monitoring and security. A comprehensive and coordinated approach was needed, to fight all illegal maritime and trafficking challenges in the region. Strengthening cooperation structures between the countries of the region to ensure effective action across borders at sea and on land is imperative. Holihead (2011) remarked that the importance of information sharing and cooperation among a wide range of agencies and actors, public and private, makes it essential to build strong planning and coordination among them, notably with the key regional organizations; ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC. Ensuring the security of the Gulf of Guinea is beyond the capacity of any existing regional body acting alone. A number of regional organizations share an interest in maritime security; these include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC). Geographical and mandate overlap argues for greater integration and coordination of maritime initiative of these various bodies, the GGC has the largest mandate for dealing specifically with maritime issues, (IMO Report, 2010). It was established in 2001 as a permanent framework for collective action, with a view to ensuring

peace, security and stability conducive to economic development in the region. Most recently, on 29 November 2012, the GGC signed the Luanda Declaration on Peace and Security in the Gulf of Guinea Region. The declaration states that in response to increasing maritime insecurity, GGC member states need to establish regional cooperation and inter-state dialogue to fight national and transnational crimes. In August 2005, the NEPAD declaration was signed in Abuja, Nigeria. This initiative alludes to the importance of bolstering security and regional cooperation (Gilpin, 2007). Besides there appears to be a need for sub-regional cooperation with regard to the management of maritime areas, both on international legal ground and from the geopolitical prospects of the Gulf of Guinea.

Also, Gulf of Guinea States and regional institutions have been implementing inter- agency and inter-navy cooperation under the structure of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) respectively. Other contributing institutions include the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC). Biang (2010) contended that Regional or rather sub-regional cooperation is a general geostrategic matter for the development of the continent, as it could be really be helpful in allowing Africa to properly manage new challenges emerging from ocean management and exploitation worldwide, for the implementation of international law in the field of ocean management, as well as the lack of long term goals in the management of State affairs in Africa.

The strategy must be underpinned by focused investment in manpower and resources, cooperation and coordination of efforts. A key aspect of this transformation process relates to the need for a new regional policy thrust hinged on the transfer of the technology and skills of the upstream and downstream sectors of the oil industry in a regionally integrated manner that would transform West Africa into a potent energy and industrial hub that connects local, regional and global needs, demand and market. Member states of the Gulf of Guinea must act to improve their cooperation and coordination on Security. The International Community has offer greater assistance to maritime security capacity in the Gulf of Guinea: The international community has offered assistance towards improving the capacity of state in the region to cope with challenges to their maritime security, including oil related criminality, illicit trade and low production. In June 2014, China and ECOWAS agreed on establishing a strategic consultative mechanism to better implement their cooperation and identify five priorities, including capacity building, peace and security, the fight against terrorism and transnational crime (ECOWAS Report, 2014). This mechanism should be harnessed to discuss more institutionalized cooperation on the Gulf of Guinea Compared to external actors like the United States and the EU, China has not yet established any targeted programs with regional organizations or individual states in joint-exercise or capacity building, and its efforts have been mostly ad-hoc based. However, effective regional cooperation in the region entails well-coordinated international support that does not result in competition for security sources from individual states. Hence, at least a minimum level of interaction or even engagement should be encouraged between China and other external actors.

It is therefore important to pay attention to sound management practices and to transparent procedures from private and public actors in order to support regional cooperation and development in refining crude oil and the processing of raw natural gas in the region. Sound management practices and transparent procedures from private and public actors the Gulf of Guinea in implementing MOWCA's initiative in a more efficient way. This discussion shall then come to its final stage by trying to further assess the connection between regional cooperation and MOWCA framework implementation as this connection may help African States especially in downstream production.

Upstream Production and Sub Regional Coast Guard

The upstream sector involves the exploration for and extraction of crude oil and natural gas in general and the sector is also known as the exploration and production (E&P) sector. The upstream sector includes the searching for potential underground or underwater oil and gas fields, drilling of exploratory wells, and subsequently operating the wells that recover and bring the crude oil and raw

natural gas to the surface. There has been a significant shift toward including unconventional gas as a part of the upstream sector, and corresponding developments in liquefied natural gas (LNG) processing and transport which has not achieved the desired result in the region. Upstream Industry has traditionally experienced the highest quantum of Mergers, Acquisitions and Divestitures due to its volatile nature and organizational setup in regulating and protecting oil and gas production in the upstream sector between member states in the region.

The upstream stage of the production process involves searching for and extracting raw materials. The upstream part of the production process does not do anything with the material itself, such as processing the material. This part of the process simply finds and extracts the raw material. Thus, any industry that relies on the extraction of raw materials commonly has an upstream stage in its production process. In a more general sense, "upstream" can also refer to any part of the production process relating to the extraction stages. Examples of Upstream Processes In the petroleum industry, locating underground or underwater oil reserves characterizes the upstream process. Additionally, the upstream process in this industry involves bringing oil and gas to the surface. Extraction wells represent an example of a structure operating in this stage in the process. The upstream stage in the production process may also manifest itself as a supplier providing raw materials to manufacturers or other businesses that ultimately process the materials. Upstream oil and gas operations identify deposits, drill wells and recover raw materials from underground. This sector also includes related services, such as rig operations, feasibility studies, and machinery rental and extraction chemical supply. Many of the largest upstream operators are the major diversified oil and gas firms, such as Exxon-Mobil whose operations has no achieve the desired result (Ogude, 2011). On the other hand, together with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), MOWCA developed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Sub-regional Integrated Coast Guard Network in West and Central Africa, which was adopted in Senegal in July 2008. To date, it has been signed by 15 of its 20 coastal member States and provides a framework to promote regional maritime cooperation and a stable maritime environment as well as the peace, good order and prosperity of West and Central Africa. The goal of the Network is to initiate joint efforts to safeguard human life, enforce laws and improve the security, safety and protection of the environment.

However, the AU supports the initiative of the Maritime Organization for West and Central Africa (MOWCA) and IMO on establishing an Integrated Coast Guard Network in the sub-region and promotes sub-regional cooperation and coordination in the provision of coast guard functions inclusive of maritime intelligence, surveillance, safety and security, protection of environment and search and rescue. In 2008, the organization formally moved to establish a sub-regional coast guard network. A memorandum of agreement was drafted and signed by 14 of the 20 member states, (IMO Report, 2010). However, 6 coastal states have yet to sign the MOU, and as such, the establishment of the multi-national security arrangement remains in negotiations and in concept, only. Their efforts in 2008 to start a sub-regional coast guard have not materialized, yet. In 2006, MOWCA decided to pursue a regional coast guard network. It remains a concept until all nations have signed the MOU. This is probably an interim solution in lieu of the still to be realized MOWCA regional coast guard. They resolved that when the draft of the MOU for the Regional Coast guard Network is presented to the Bureau of Ministers for ratification and adoption, the coast guard should be established to fight piracy, robberies, pollution, illegal fishing, national and transnational crimes, and unlawful acts along West and Central African shores. Providing that MOWCA can get unanimous agreement on the MOU and move forward with concrete progress in implementing this, an additional missing piece may be the coordination and alignment of the different states' legal code to empower the regional coast guard to legitimately patrol and enforce maritime security laws across the region.

All of this will address the potential to ensure maritime security. Their regional coast guard and its support network will still need to develop its operational capacity in actually conducting patrols jointly, such as the one adopted by Nigeria and Benin Republic and mutually enforcing maritime security measures. Anything

resembling this will be progress between states in the region.

MOWCA's sub-regional coastguard project was reviewed at the second and third session, of the Bureau of Ministers in May 2002 and 2003, (IMO Report, 2010). At the meeting, MOWCA agreed to establish a working camp to coordinate the development of the sub-region's integrated Coast guard Network from Mauritania to Angola, as a basis for Regional Corporation. It was gathered that the sub-region has been divided into four zones to ensure that not more than five coastal member states are in a coastguard zone for effective coordination. The coastguard zones are as follows:

- Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, with Dakar in Senegal as the coastguard Centre.
- Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana, with Abidjan in Cote d'Ivoire as the coastguard Centre.
- Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, with Lagos as the coastguard centre.
- Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe, Congo Democratic Republic, Angola with Pointe Noire, Congo as the Coastguard Centre.

However, the principal coordinating centers are yet to be confirmed but the adoption of coast guard initiative has been embraced by all especially for the protection of major sector such as the upstream such as adopted in 2010 by Nigeria and Benin Republic

In response, Coast Guard services and other relevant capacities of the region must be enhanced, with significant international support. Recently, Nigeria approved the purchase of two 1,800- ton Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) from China, and the first one was officially delivered in November 2014 with these two ships, the largest and most advanced vessels in the Nigerian navy, Nigeria becomes the first nation in West Africa to operate Chinese warships, and they will carry out a wide range of missions, such as protection of offshore oil fields and recovery from oil spills, (People's Daily Online, November 28, 2014). Furthermore, the ex-US Coast Guard cutter, GALLATIN (re-named NNS OKPABANA) and NNS CENTENARY (the first of the two OPVs from China) has joined the Nigeria Navy fleet. Part of the construction of the second OPV is expected to be undertaken at the Nigerian Navy Shipyard (NNSY) in line with the need to continually develop indigenous capacity in specialized areas such as shipbuilding.

MOWCA's intent was to establish a regional coast guard, which covered over 1 million square nautical miles of EEZ, with 20 coastal states who currently have little history of maritime competence and limited operational capacity; some of the member states are lacking sufficient codified legal code necessary for the enforcement of maritime security. This is a laudable, grand solution that is still awaiting signatures from the member states for the last half decade and remains solely a good idea. It was too broad of an aim with too little extant capacity to execute it. Confidence in pursuit of the objectives is necessary for regime success, but this is built from realizing sustained benefits from the effort.

The coast guard is a laudable venture that is possible in solving problems such as associated with the upstream sector in the Gulf of Guinea. Vogel (2009) made it succinctly and remarked that the coast guard would solve problems identified in the region, which he also shows in the table two below.

Academic Journal of Current Research
Vol.6, No.7, July-2019;
ISSN (2343 – 403X);
p –ISSN 3244 – 5621
Impact factor: 7.91

Table 2: Operational Scope of Coastal Guard in the Gulf of Guinea

	Coast Guard	**Navy**	**African maritime forces**
Missions	Maritime safety, law enforcement, environmental protection, and border security within exclusive economic zone	War, international sea lanes, and foreign policy on high seas/outside national boundaries	Primarily maritime safety, law enforcement, environmental protection, and border security within EEZ, some foreign policy and peacekeeping abroad.
Assets	Tugs, patrol cutters, aids to navigation, harbor patrol and other small boats, fixed and rotary wing aircraft for search and rescue interdiction.	Amphibious landing ships, surface combatants, vessels for aerial warfare, submarines, support vessels	Hodgepodge of donations, corvettes, small patrol boats, some amphibious landing craft, and submarines.
Bureaucratic Affiliation	Various: homeland, security, department of fisheries and oceans, ministry of infrastructure and transport	Ministry/department of defense	Ministry/department of defense.
Training	Operations of assets, coast guard missions.	Operation of assets, war	Operation of assets, war
Partnerships	National (judicial, fisheries, ports etc)	Military (army, air force, etc)	National (Judicial, fisheries, ports, etc.)

Source: Vogel (2009)

Drilling Activities and Sealed Grid Framework

The oil and gas drilling sectors are recognized as being a vital part of the Gulf of Guinea state economy in both the long-and the short-term. In recent decades, however, they have been subject to scrutiny on the basis of environmental issues including air and water quality regulation, offshore regulation and chemical management. This has occurred in conjunction with other measures used to encourage energy production and establishing shale gas infrastructure.

There is no regional oil and gas company in the Gulf of Guinea. Instead, there are numerous businesses operating in the sector, including large international corporations. The activities of these companies are regulated on the state, regional and international level. To begin exploration for oil and gas drilling, the business must obtain a development permit, a drilling permit and an operating permit. The requirements for gaining these permits are stipulated at the state level. There must also be a public review period, which is often contentious. All permits must be obtained prior to beginning exploration, or the applicant may face delays and financial and legal penalties. Typical activities during the drilling and development of an oil or gas well include ground clearing and removal of vegetative cover, grading, drilling, waste management, vehicular and pedestrian traffic, and construction and installation of facilities. Activities conducted in locations other than at the oil and gas site may include excavation/blasting for construction materials, access road and storage area

Academic Journal of Current Research
Vol.6, No.7, July-2019;
ISSN (2343 – 403X);
p –ISSN 3244 – 5621
Impact factor: 7.91

construction, and construction of and compressor or pumping stations. Potential impacts from these activities affect offshore activities which in turn affect the transportation of goods and services under the sealed grid system.

The working relationships that characterize a drilling project depend on the well's location, the arrangements between the companies involved in the project and the number of personnel involved. A small onshore rig may be crewed by no more than five contractor employees and managed by just one or two contractor and operator representatives, while some large offshore drilling operations may have several rig crews and groups of specialists totaling 50 or more persons, along with dozens of land-based technical and support personnel. These working relationship during the drilling process constitute security threat to both people and the environment. The transportation and shipping line is also affected by this drilling process especially by non-state actors who illegally drill oil and gas especially offshore.

The sealed grid is material made of metallic or seal net, synthetic or semi-reinforced synthetic net, stretched over a 10, 20, 30 or 40-tonne loaded truck and conserved by customs officials to provide safety and security in the international transportation of goods. The GSC organized the exhibition as the host institution, to display the caravan and the sealed grid material. Under the auspices of the Maritime Organization for West and Central Africa (MOWCA), the system had been introduced to facilitate and provide safety for inter-state transportation of goods as well as the transportation of transit cargo in the West Africa sub-region. The system is being tested along corridor one, that is from Abidjan to Lagos, and corridor two, stretching from Dakar to Niamey. MOWCA approved the new system as far back as 2001 as one of the sub-regional projects and went ahead in 2003 to recommend it's testing to ascertain its reliability and effectiveness as a customs sealing of merchandise for the inter-state transportation of goods in the sub-region. Mr Martey urged stakeholders to take full advantage of the presence of the test caravan in the country by learning as much about the system as possible and to examine how it could help address the nagging challenges of transit trade within the sub-region. Mr Bernard Gohibi, MOWCA representative at the exhibition, was optimistic that the successful test of the system would further strengthen economic co-operation amongst members-states. Mr E.K. Arku, Deputy Freight and Logistics Manager of GSC, admitted that even though the awareness that trade among Africans, being one major way to secure economic independence for Africa had not been lost on people on the continent, practical steps that must be taken to ensure optimum inter- regional trade had largely been weak.

Onshore, Offshore Activities and Sub Regional Maritime Fund

The vast majority of the attacks occur onshore or in 65 km of Nigeria's coastline Bergen Risk Solutions (2007) and Giroux (2008). On land, the oil pipelines are often exposed and unguarded; onshore terminals are also at risk because of their large, open oil and gas storage tanks and because they are located near villages and rivers where militants can hide (ICG, 2006a: 24; Tattersall, 2008). Oil companies from the West and the East have made huge investments for both onshore and offshore drilling, and since the region has the fastest rate of discovery of new oil reserves in the world, it also attracts new investments for further exploration. Deep offshore oil fields in the Gulf of Guinea are considered the greatest and most profitable prize in Africa; the dominant companies are Exxon, Shell, BP and a handful of others, while most other companies lack the financial and above all the technical capability to seriously rival them.

On the other hand, maritime fund and support from both regional and international bodies help to maintain the efficiency and continuous existence of oil and gas companies in the region. Given both the nature of the challenge and the geography of the zone, AFRICOM took that position that a regional approach to maritime security was the only way to respond to these conditions and keep vital transportation corridors, offshore and onshore exploration industries open to trade.

There have been only a few attacks on offshore infrastructure. There are fewer offshore installations (less than ten) than onshore installations, and the logistics of mounting an attack are more challenging. Both factors could change, however. A combination of technological

Academic Journal of Current Research
Vol.6, No.7, July-2019;
ISSN (2343 – 403X);
p –ISSN 3244 – 5621
Impact factor: 7.91

breakthroughs that enable deep-water drilling and the discovery of rich offshore fields have led to a shift in the production of oil offshore. As militants develop more sophisticated capabilities, offshore facilities could be at risk as well. We have seen a preview of this. In June 2008, a party of MEND militants attacked Shell's Bonga floating production, storage, and off-loading (FPSO) vessel. At more than 300 m long, Bonga is one of the world's largest FPSOs. It sits 120 km offshore in the Gulf of Guinea and had been thought to be beyond the reach of insurgents (JTIC, 2009). Even though MEND did not achieve its objective, which was to reach Bonga's control room, the attack caused panic in the oil markets, when Shell invoked force majeure and halted the Bonga platform's June and July 2008 production, which is normally 225,000 bpd (Tattersall, 2008).

Militant attacks on deep-water facilities have not yet increased since the Bonga strike, although it did demonstrate that such attacks are in the capabilities of at least one militant group. The environmental impact of both the attacks on and the work of, the oil and gas industry have been severe. The fresh water around the oil wells is too polluted to drink. Much of the oil pollution in the creeks is caused by bunkering in general in the region due to uncontrolled onshore and offshore activities.

The region's loss of revenue from maritime trade, and port fees and, above all, the loss of human life warrant better understanding of the onshore-offshore linkages that drive maritime insecurity. The growth of maritime crime is caused by structural problems such as poverty, socio-political tension and the grievances of local communities as noted by (Ukeje, 2008). The extent of national and transnational crimes is an indicator of the radicalization of the alienated and their willingness to turn to crime. Other factors are the region's densely populated conurbations, porous borders, quarrels between states and the inability to stop illegal trade in arms, oil and drugs.

Our focus is on offshore protection because that is where nearly all new petroleum and natural gas production, both in Nigeria and in nearby nations, is taking place. Additionally, attackers of offshore installations must travel on the water's surface, which means they are exposed. With the aid of a cueing system, an aircraft has a good chance of picking up a target and then tracking it if well-funded. Moreover, offshore facilities require a substantial capital investment and individually produce much more than do a typical onshore facility. Cost-benefit considerations therefore justify a sizable investment in the security of these facilities. In contrast, onshore oil installations and their environs are covered by a dense canopy of heavy foliage, enabling attackers to operate clandestinely; surveillance and tracking from the air is marginally effective at best. Additionally, the onshore oil infrastructure is much more fragmented, consisting of many modest-size facilities spread out over a broad area. The output of each individual production facility is modest compared to those of the large offshore facilities, making it harder to justify substantial investment in an expensive security system, even if it could work operationally. While attacks on the offshore infrastructure have been relatively limited thus far, the current situation may not last. As production continues to shift offshore, we can expect militants to turn their attention to these lucrative targets.

In summary, threats to the oil producing and transporting infrastructure onshore are difficult to cope with. Improving the security of the oil producing infrastructure onshore will hinge more on improving relations between states and shipping, coupled with effective and in corrupt policing made possible through maritime funding but as production steadily moves offshore, however, aviation forces can make a stronger contribution to securing the infrastructure. The Director General of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), Mr. Ziakede Akpobolokemi, in his paper to the Navy's meeting titled, 'Enhancing Nigerian Navy Operations through Effective Inter-Agency Co-operation', stated that "because of the operational challenges associated with securing our offshore oil production facilities in Nigeria due to their locations in the Exclusive Economic Zone, the Nigerian Navy requires an excellent synergy of efforts from private and governmental entities with a view to sourcing additional funds to support its offshore operations." In short, given the region's geo-strategic and maritime significance, ensuring that good order prevails at sea has become a critical issue for Gulf of Guinea states as well as other powers with growing economic interests in the

Academic Journal of Current Research
Vol.6, No.7, July-2019;
ISSN (2343 – 403X);
p –ISSN 3244 – 5621
Impact factor: 7.91

region. And since many of the drivers of maritime insecurity are to be found onshore, efforts to address offshore security must begin onshore, (Uadiale, 2013).

AFRICOM also supports the efforts by regional governments to develop improved capabilities for providing security to both vessels and offshore installations. The climate of insecurity would discourage investments, particularly in the offshore oil sector. This ranges from actually having vessels that can get underway, to having trained operators who can effectively conduct maritime security missions to the resourcing of and effective use of operating funds to make the training and operations happen.

To this end, the data presented above in this chapter, it becomes evident to deduce that the exploration of oil and gas contributed and gave rise to the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa supported initiative in Gulf of Guinea within the period under study. Therefore our first hypothesis that states that the exploration of oil and gas enhanced the effectiveness of Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa supported initiative in Gulf of Guinea is thereby validated and accepted.

Conclusion

The article examined the nexus between regional cooperation and resource governance in the Gulf of Guinea. The paper thus argued that the quest to secure the Gulf of Guinea for uninterrupted oil and gas exploration informed the establishment of Maritime Organization of West Africa (MOWCA). This was followed by several initiatives by the body; the paper noted that member states cooperation is vital in addressing insecurity that has undermined oil and gas production in the region. The study found that illegal exploration of oil and gas in the region coupled with piracy and armed robbery are major challenges that should be solved, since these problems were systematically created by non-state actors that have interest in the region. The study also noted that lackadaisical attitude of some member states has undermined efforts of regional bodies in addressing challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. Against the foregoing the study recommends that that the Gulf of Guinea states under regional organization such as MOWCA should encourage and adopt massive security initiatives to suppress piracy and armed robbery, so as to harness full economic and political potentials of the region among others.

References

Basedau, M. & Mahler, A. (2010). Revisiting the resource conflict link: *A systematic comparative Test of Causal Mechanisms.* Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest political science association, 68th annual National Conference, April 21 – 25, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois.

Basedau, M. & Mahler, A. (2011). *New oil finds in the region: New Risks for the region.* Abuja: FES.

Delano, K.H. (2009). "The Gulf of Guinea and Its Strategic Center Point: How Nigeria will Bridge American and African cooperation". A research report submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of the Graduation Requirement. Maxwell Air force Base, Alabama. April.

FES Report, (2011*). Overview of Existing Regional Initiatives in Oil and Gas Sector in the Gulf of Guinea.* Abuja: FES

Frynas, J.G and Paulo, M. (2007). A New Scramble for Africa: Historical Political, and Business Perspectives African Affairs 106/423, 229-251 do1:10.1093/Afraf/ad1042. Oxford University Press. Accessed from http://www.google.html.a newscramble_for_africa Retrieved on 26/8/2015

Gilpins, R. (2007). "Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea", *Strategic Insight*, Volume VI, Issues 1.

Holihead, P. (2011). "Information Sharing: A Key to Surviving in Pirate Infested water". Dubai School of Government (Ed) Selected Briefing Papers on Global Challenge, Regional Responses: Forging a Common Approach to Maritime Piracy, Dubai, UAE.

ICG, (2012). "International Crisis Group: the Gulf or Guinea". The New Danger Zone. *Africa Report*. No 195.

Imo Report, (2010). IMO/MOWCA Meeting to Progress the Implementation of an Integrated Coast Guard Function Network for West and Central African Countries-Accra, Ghana, 13-17 December, 2010 TC/0206-24-20170. Accessed from http://www.google.html.accra Retrieved on (25/5/2015).

Keeney, G.C. (2013). "United States Naval Contributions to Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea". *Naval War College:* EMC.

Kwaja, M.A (2011). "Maritime Insecurities in the Gulf of Guinea", *West Africa Insight*, May 2011 P.1

Mahler, A. (2010). "Nigerian: A prime example of the resource curse revisiting the oil violence link in the Niger Delta". GIGA Working papers No. 120. January.

Mane, O. (2005), "Emergence of the Gulf of Guinea in the Global Economy: Prospects and Challenges", IMF Working Paper WP/05/235, Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund.

Soares De Oliveira, R. (2007). *Oil Politics in the Gulf of Guinea*. London: Hurst and Company,

Uadiale, M. (2013). "Issues of Maritime (In) Security: Center for Transatlantic Trade*". Africa Strategic Forum.*

Ukeje, C. (2013). *African Approaches to maritime Security – The Gulf of Guinea.* Abuja: FES

UNEP, (2009). "From Conflict to Peace Building. The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment". UNEP: Nairobi

Vogel, A. (2009). "Navies versus coast Guard: Defining the Roles of African Maritime Security forces. *ACSS Africa Security Brief.* No. 2, December

Young Oran, R. (1987).*International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and*