Academic Journal of Current Research
Vol.8, No.7; July-2021;
ISSN (2343 – 403X);
p –ISSN 3244 - 5621
Impact factor: 7.91

OIL GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA AND THE REGULATION OF FISHING INDUSTRY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA BETWEEN 2010 AND 2017

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Abstract: This paper examined oil governance in Nigeria and the regulation of fishing industry in the GOG. It specifically analyzed the contradictions of oil governance in Nigeria and their implications for the rise in IUU fishing. The basic propositions of rentierism was adopted in explaining how oil management leads to poor commitment of the Nigerian government as a regional power to cooperate with other GOG states to tackle IUU fishing. The study provided relevant data that support these claims and recommended economic diversification in Nigeria as a necessary condition to improve regulation of the fishing industry in the GOG.

Keywords: Oil Governance, IUU Fishing, Rentierism, Gulf of Guinea, Fishing Industry, Maritime Secuirty

INTRODUCTION

In recent times, the Gulf of Guinea (GOG) waterways have served as a critical gateway to the world for virtually all of its littoral countries which depend on access to the sea for the import and export of goods and services from and to major global markets. According to Ukeje and Mvomo-Ela (2013), the region has fast become pivotal to international navigation as a relatively safer route connecting the Far East to countries in the North and South of the Atlantic, given that over 90 percent of global freight is by sea. The GOG has no doubt, become a veritable sea-route for international trade and commerce, especially now that the shorter Arab Gulf passage is costlier and riskier due to wars and piracy in the Middle East and North Africa.

According to Adibe (2016), international interest in the GOG has significantly increased in recent years due to the rise in its volume of global trade, associated with the discovery of considerable oil and natural gas deposits along the coast and offshore. Some countries with deposits have become focus of a multiple and growing interest. As noted by Ricardo (2007), the GOG has become one of the main sources of oil and gas imported by Europe, the United States, China, India and Brazil with Nigeria and Angola as the leading regional producer for several decades.

The Gulf's raw materials and hydrocarbons make the region an increasingly coveted zone which attracts the attention of many actors; local communities claiming rights of use and a share of the wealth generated by these resources; states anxious to ensure sovereign control; and

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private companies that have been operating there for some time (Adibe et al, 2018 and Riols, 2011). Maritime security is no doubt essential to maintaining the flow of revenues from oil and gas, which have the potential to contribute significantly to development in the region. Maritime security is also important for exploiting maritime resources, securing livelihood and development. Maritime resources such as fish, agriculture and intact ecosystems directly contribute to the livelihoods of many Africans (Ukonga, 2013). Fish stocks are an important source of protein in the GOG. For instance, Angolan annual per capital food supply from fish and fishery products between 2002 and 2007 was 14kg per person – above the sub-Saharan average of 8kg. Also, the poorest 40 percent of the regional population depend on fish as a crucial component of their diet (Adibe et al, 2018 and Ukonga, 2013).

However, in addition to piracy raising the concerns of the international community, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing occurring in the GOG is also an area of concern to states in the region. According to a study funded jointly by the United Kingdom government and the Pew Charitable Trusts, IUU fishing is estimated to be between US$ 10 billion and US$ 23 billion annually (Adibe, 2016). Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, also known as pirate fishing, usually involve vessels fishing in areas where they do not have a license to operate; it can take place in domestic waters or on the high seas by foreign or domestic vessels (High Seas Task Force, 2006). Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to IUU fishing. In West Africa for example, IUU fishing accounts for 40 percent of fish caught, posing serious environmental, social, and economic challenges to countries and communities that rely on fish for food, employment and revenues. In addition, IUU fishing poses serious challenges to the effective management and conservation of fisheries (Balton, 2004). IUU fishing is made up of three different components. The meanings of each component were established in the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing in 2001.

The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in 2001 defined the components of IUU fishing. It referred to Illegal fishing as activities conducted by nationals or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a state, without the permission of that state, or in contravention of its laws and regulations; conducted by vessels flying the flag of states that are parties to a relevant regional fisheries management organization but operate in contravention of the conservation and management measures adopted by that organization and by which the states are bound, or relevant provisions of the applicable international law; or in violation of national laws or international obligations, including those undertaken by co-operating states to a relevant regional fisheries management organization. FAO defined unreported fishing as fishing activities; which have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the relevant national authority, in contravention of national laws and regulations; or undertaken in the area of competence of a relevant regional fisheries management organization which have not been reported or have been misreported, in contravention of reporting procedures of that organization. The FAO defined unregulated fishing as fishing activities in the area of application of a relevant regional fisheries management organization that are conducted by vessels without nationality or by those flying the flag of a state not party to that organization, or by a fishing entity, in a manner that is not consistent with or contravenes the conservation and management measures of that organization; or in areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no applicable conservation or management measures (FAO 2001).

One common argument in the literature is to associate ineffective control of IUU fishing on loopholes within

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Vol.8, No.7; July-2021;
ISSN (2343 – 403X);
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fishing laws in GOG states. Stiles (2013) for instance noted that easy nature of registering fishing vessels in GOG states create a problem of overcapacity. This results in too many fishing fleets for the number of fish available, resulting in the rise of IUU fishing as competition and the depletion of fish populations drive fishermen to protected areas. Martini (2013) also noted that fishing laws in GOG states create manipulative opportunities for fishing vessels' operators to engage in IUU fishing because the ability of operators to register and flag their vessels in a country that is not the country where they came from means that these operators usually choose countries that will not regulate their activities and will be unlikely to enforce domestic or international fishing rules. However, such argument fails to provide any insight on why affected governments are yet to establish more stringent national or multilateral fishing rules in the GOG.

Scholars like Fabra (2002) and Johnson (1993) have also linked ineffective control of IUU fishing in GOG States, particularly Nigeria, to socio-economic factor like poverty. Fabra (2002) for instance argued that environmental degrading activities and poverty are inextricably intertwined. The consequence of the linkage is a vicious cycle in which poverty causes citizens to degrade their environment through over exploitation of its natural resources for economic survival. Also, Johnson (1993) argued that poverty at the private level leads to the poor being forced to rely on the ecosystem for their nutritional and energy needs, thereby leading in most cases, to the degradation of the environment. While poverty leads to over exploitation of the ecosystem for economic survival at the private level, it cannot account for the ineffective control of IUU fishing by government agencies. The argument tends to erroneously suggest that in poor countries, only nationals engage in IUU fishing, thereby, ignoring the role of foreign vessels and actors in perpetuating such criminal activities.

To understand why IUU fishing has been on the rise in the GOG, there is need to understand how the dominance of oil trade in the region shapes states' commitment to combat the menace. Nigeria has been the leading regional producer of oil for several decades. In terms of population for instance, Nigerians account for more than half of the region's estimated 300 million people. The Nigerian market accounts for more than 60 percent of the region's volume of trade which makes it the biggest economy in the GOG (Adibe, 2016 and Crisis Group Report, 2012). Nigeria contributes almost 70 percent of the regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and its oil industry is the most important industry in the entire region. Oil is the region's most valuable export and constitutes more than 70 percent of total foreign exchange earnings by GOG states. Also, the rise in organized criminal trade such as IUU fishing in the GOG is associated with their rise in oil-producing GOG states. In other words, the maritime domain of oil-producing states, particularly Nigeria, account for most of the IUU fishing in the GOG.

The foregoing suggests that insecurity in the coast of Nigeria is implicated in maritime insecurity in the entire Gulf of Guinea. It follows that analyses on why there is rise in IUU fishing in the GOG require an understanding of the contradictions of oil governance in Nigeria and their implications for this rise in the region. Thus, the specific focus of this study was to examine the contradictions of oil governance in Nigeria and their implications for the rise in IUU fishing in the GOG.

Rentier Oil Governance In Nigeria And Administrative Lapses Fishing Regulation

At independence up till the mid 1970s, there were strong trends that Nigeria was and could remain largely a self-sufficient nation in terms of the food requirements for its citizens. As noted by Ukwaba and Adibe (2014), before the mid 1970s, Nigeria produced all its food needs and surplus for its promising agro-industries and for exports. The management of economic resources was not rentier

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in character before oil began to play a dominant role in the Nigerian economy. Although non-oil earnings, particularly agricultural earnings constituted the bulk of the nation's foreign exchange earnings, there was active participation of citizens in production-related activities in the agricultural sector with the sector employing over 70 percent of the population (Ukwaba and Adibe, 2014). Evidences are bound to show how the agricultural sector flourished in Nigeria before oil became the nation's dominant foreign exchange earner. According to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) annual report and statement of accounts for selected years, agricultural export constituted 85 percent of Nigeria's total export value in the decade before independence and close to 80 percent between 1960 and 1964. Despite the disruption in economic growth as a result of the 3 years of civil war in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970, agricultural export in Nigeria between 1965 and 1970 accounted for over 56 percent of the total export in the country. This was however followed by drastic decline between 1970 and 1974; the period oil became a major revenue earning source in the country. Majority of Nigerians were also engaged agricultural production with the sector employing over 70 percent of the working population. Thus, resource management in the pre-oil era was not rentier in character (Adibe, 2016).

According to Beblawi and Luciani (1987), four characteristics must be present in order for a state to be classified as rentier. First, the rentier economy of which the state is a subset must be one where rent situations predominate. Secondly, the origin of the rent must be external to the economy. In other words, the rent must come predominantly from foreign sources. This means that domestic rent, even if it were substantial enough to predominate, cannot be sufficient to characterize such an economy as rentier. Thirdly, in a rentier state, only a few are engaged in the generation of rents, while the majority is involved in the distribution and consumption. Finally, the government must be the principal recipient of the external rent in the economy.

The commercial exploration of oil in Nigeria changed the management style of the nation's resources to rentier approach. In the 1950s, petroleum output was insignificant, amounting to less than 2 percent of total exports. However, oil output exploded from just over 5 million to over 600 million barrels between 1960 and 1973 (Onuoha, 2013). The Federal Government of Nigeria is the sole oil rent collector. The dominance of a particular resource as a major source of revenue does not necessarily make an economy rentier if the source of the rent is not external to the economy and/or if majority of the country's workforce is engaged in its production. This is not the situation with Nigeria's oil rent. Less than two percent of the population is involved in its production and the source of the rent is external to the economy, with production geared toward external consumption. Tables one and two below give an insight into the rentier nature of the Nigerian economy. Oil revenue account for most of the Nigerian government budgetary spending and oil production is geared towards external consumption. In fact, less than 20 percent of what is produced is domestically consumed.

Table One: Nigeria's Oil and Non-Oil Earnings, 2010-2017

Year	Oil Earnings (US$)	Non-Oil Earnings (US$)
2010	70 billion	N.A
2011	99 billion	N.A
2012	94 billion	N.A
2013	58.07 billion	3 billion
2014	55.5 billion	2.7 billion
2015	37 billion	1.6 billion
2016	26 billion	3.2 billion
2017	34 billion	2.34 billion

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Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Annual Abstract of Statistics for Various Years

N.A means not available

Table Two: Nigeria's Oil Production and Consumption, 2010-2017

Year	Oil Production (thousand barrel per day)	Oil Consumption (thousand barrel per day)
2010	2,534	283.00
2011	2,463	287.00
2012	2,413	279.00
2013	2,280	280.00
2014	2,278	279.00
2015	2,204	274.00
2016	1,903	300.00
2017	1,968	289.00

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin for Various Years

The dominance of oil rent in the Nigerian economy has implications for the management of the fishing industry, not only in Nigeria, but also in the GOG. Fisheries ventures rank among those yielding very high revenues of all the sub-sectors of Agriculture in Nigeria. According to Adibe (2016), the Federal Department of Fisheries (FDF) generates an average of a total sum of over 40 million naira annually from licensing trawlers. The annual demand for fish in Nigeria is about 1.5million tonnes. Unfortunately, local production is not more than 0.4 million tonnes, creating a deficit of 1.1million tonnes. In order to fill the deficit, Nigeria imports fish for domestic consumption (Falaye, 2008). Nigeria is the world's largest importer of frozen fish because it tuna fisheries is not developed. Information available from the Nigeria Institute of Oceanography and Marine Research indicates that tuna fisheries resources are abundant off the Nigerian coast. Some foreign boats are actively fishing for tuna in these areas, with an estimated catch of 10,000MT per annum (Adibe, 2016).

The Nigerian fishing sector consists of two main components: the artisanal (small scale) and the industrial fisheries. The artisanal sub-sector is characterized by low capital outlay and technology application, low operational cost, intensive labour, cheap fish distribution network and orientation to local markets. In spite of the low technological development, this sector has remained the backbone of domestic fish production in Nigeria. It has an average contribution of over 70 percent to total fish production. Over 600,000 families are currently engaged in the small-scale exploitation of the marine fisheries resource (Falaye, 2008).

The industrial sub-sector, on the other hand, is characterized by factors opposite of those in the artisanal sector with its high capital outlay and advanced technology application. Its contribution to total domestic fish production is about 3.7 percent on the average. Its major strength lies in its capacity to generate foreign exchange through the exports of frozen shrimps worth an estimated value of over US$20million per annum. The industrial fisheries sub-sector has in its employment, over 20,000 members of staff and about 500,000 fish retailers. The industrial sub-sector operates a total of 226 trawlers. The sub-sector is over capitalized in the procurement of trawlers (Falaye, 2008). Administrative control of fishing in Nigeria is ineffective and inefficient. The marine sub-sector has a potential yield of tuna and *mesopeagics*, however, these resources remain unexploited because of the financial outlay required and lack of required technology. Currently, Nigeria has no vessels actively exploiting this stock (Adibe, 2016).

The main fisheries law for Nigeria is the Sea Fisheries Act No. 71 of 1992 and the Inland Fisheries Act No. 108. The Ministry of Agriculture and Water resources has exclusive responsibility for managing the marine

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resources, and a shared responsibility with states for inland resources. Management measures include technical and input controls, and to some extent, output controls and economic incentives. The Sea Fisheries Act requires all industrial fishing boats operating within Nigerian Waters to be licensed and catches from industrial vessels must be inspected by a fisheries inspector before or after landing. Trawlers are required to submit catch for inspection. However, there are no observers' on-board vessels in Nigerian fisheries. The Act noted that every operating vessel must be licensed either to fish or to shrimp. In Nigeria, there is no deliberate attempt to limit the total number of vessel by the licensing authority.

The high cost associated with technological adaption in the regulation of the fishing industry in Nigeria, coupled with the minimal inflow of FDI into the sector as a result of the rent-like management of oil resources, affect effective regulation of the industry in Nigeria. This situation is worsened by the reliance on oil income for most of government spending. The implication of the above is the continuous rise in IUU fishing in Nigeria, and its neighboring states in the GOG since fishing vessels registered in Nigeria are permitted by the law to engage in fishing activities off the coast of these neighboring states on the basis of bi-lateral understanding between Nigeria and the respective states.

Table Three: Nigeria's Fisheries Economic Data (Country Summary)

Area of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)	164,054 km sq
Length of Coastline	853 km
Fish Production (Volume)	505,839 MT
Fish Consumption (per capita)	9.9 kg/year
Principle Fisheries Laws	Sea Fisheries Act No 71 and Inland Fisheries Act No 108
Port State Control Measure in Place	None
NPOA-IUU Fishing in Place	None
Number of Patrol Vessels	None
Aerial Surveillance	None
Vessel Monitoring System	None
Number of Fishery Inspectors	25
Number of Fishery Observers	15
Regional Fisheries Cooperation	Fishery Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea (FCWC) and International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)

Source: Stop Illegal Fishing Report (2014) and Adibe (2016)

Table three above shows that the regulatory capacity of Nigerian government in the fishing industry is weak and incapable of effectively regulating the sector. There are no state of the art equipments that can be used to monitor fishing activities on the high sea and the number of licensed inspectors, as well as observers is grossly inadequate. For instance, there are no patrol vessels and aerial surveillance to monitor activities in the high sea. Nigeria is also yet to develop a nation plan of action to prevent, deter eliminate IUU fishing. The health of the industry is in a deplorable state as Nigerian onshore fishery resources are over exploited, shown by the decreasing individual size of fish landed (Adibe, 2016). With regard to the industrial sector, it is suspected that the main IUU activities are the under-reporting of catches, illegal transshipment at sea and illegal sales of fish at sea.

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In the artisanal sector, the most serious challenge is the encroachment of trawlers on the 5 nautical miles limit reserved by law for the artisanal coastal fishery (Stop Illegal Fishing, 2014). It should be noted also that the Act that guides the sector has been in operation for almost three decades and needs to be updated in line with present realities.

Table Four: State Institutions Involved in the Management of Fishing Activities in Nigeria

Institutions	**Capability to Carryout Patrol/Surveillance in High Sea**
Federal Department of Fisheries (DFD)	Not involved in patrol/surveillance
Fisheries Resource Monitoring Control and Surveillance Unit (MCS)	Not involved in patrol/surveillance
Fish Quality Control and Assurance Service	Not involved in patrol/surveillance
Fish Disease Control	Not involved in patrol/surveillance
Inland Fisheries Monitoring Control Surveillance	Not involved in patrol/surveillance
Nigerian Navy	**Involved in patrol/surveillance**
Nigerian Food and Drugs Administration and Control (NAFDAC)	Not involved in patrol/surveillance
Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA)	Not involved in patrol/surveillance
Inland Waterways Department	Not involved in patrol/surveillance
Department of Fisheries at state Level	Not involved in patrol/surveillance

Source: Authors' Compilation from Field Observation and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)

Table four gives a clearer understanding of the extent of administrative lapses in fishing regulation in Nigeria. The nature of the problem is two folds. First, there is an overlap of duties as most agencies perform related functions. This undermines effectiveness and efficiency as limited funds released by the government is split between them and proactive measures are often taken due to lack of clarification on areas of jurisdictions. Secondly, most sharp practices that constitute IUU fishing are carried out on the high sea but only the Nigerian Navy has the capacity to carry out patrol activities on the high sea among these agencies. However, our investigation also revealed that the Nigerian Navy prioritizes the fight against oil piracy in the high sea and most of the arrests and seizures made involve oil-related crimes. Our investigation also showed that the Nigerian Ports Authority oil trade security over fish trade. IUU fishing as a criminal activity often involve armed transnational network of criminals collaborating, apart from the Nigerian Navy however, no agency directly involved in the fishing industry is an arm-carrying agency. They often rely on security agencies that are not equipped and trained for maritime related activities to stop crime on the high sea.

DOMINANCE OF NIGERIAN OIL TRADE AND ESCALATION OF IUU FISHING IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

Excessive reliance on oil revenue for most of government spending has implication for the rise of illegitimate fish trade with the GOG. IUU fisheries are global phenomenon which requires international holistic approach to curb. Fish and fishery products are an important source of food within the Gulf of Guinea. The annual fish consumption per capita in the region is significantly higher than the African average of 7kg per year, except for Guinea Bissau. Some countries like Senegal far exceed the global average of 16kg per year (Ifesinachi and Nwangwu, 2015). However, regulation

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remains weak as regional cooperation in the management of illegal fishing is poor, partly due Nigeria's weak commitment as the largest and strongest state in the region to take a leading role in addressing the crisis. Although, there is paucity of data on the actual value of IUU fishing in the GOG due to the clandestine nature of the crime and most states' inability in the region to monitor criminal activities in the fishing industry, available media and international agencies reports give some idea on the extent of the crime.

Table Five: IUU Fishing Percentage of Total Fishing in the GOG, 2010-2017

Years	Percentage
2010-2011	39
2012-2013	40.2
2014	40
2015-2017*	35

Source: Adibe (2016) and *Authors' Compilation from Various Media and Institutional Reports

Table five shows that almost an average of 40 percent of total fishing in the GOG was illegal. According to relevant agencies, the value of this illegal trade rose from an estimate of about US$400 million in 2010 to US$2.3 billion in 2017. According to Adibe (2016), the situation is worsened by the fact that fish import bill of GOG states has been on the increase. It rose by 3.7 percent between 2010 and 2014 for instance. IUU fishing in the GOG portrays a trend that shows little or no state interest in tackling the problem, particularly oil producing states like Nigeria. Most of the fishing vessels that engage in IUU fishing in the international and coastal waters of the GOG are ships that have been blacklisted in other regions, yet, these ships often sail unchecked in the GOG. An assessment of table six below gives a clearer picture of how Nigeria is implicated the escalation of IUU fishing in the GOG.

Table Six: Nigeria's Percentage Share in IUU Fishing Statistics in GOG, 2010-2017

Share of Estimated Loss (2010-2014)	30.4
Share of Estimated Loss (2015-2017)	34.7
Share of Illegal Fishing Vessels that Enters the GOG	65
Share of Blacklisted Fishing Vessels Re-Registered by GOG States	96

Source: Authors' Compilation from Various Media and Institutional Reports

In terms of revenue loss, Nigeria is the worst affected by IUU fishing in the GOG. While it had an estimated 30.4 percent of the total GOG loss between 2010 and 2014, its share of estimated loss rose to 34.7 percent between 2015 and 2017. Also, available reports from media and organizations like FCWC and Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) observed that 65 percent of illegal fishing cargo in the region transit in Nigeria, suggesting that the country could be a safe haven for international fishing vessels operating illegally in the region. This is supported by *Thisday* Newspaper report in Nigeria on 7 March, 2018, which noted that Nigeria loses US$70 million annually to IUU fishing by Chinese Vessels operating illegally in her maritime domain. Nigeria is also a safe haven for blacklisted fishing vessels to re-register due to the porosity of fishing laws in Nigeria. Table six also showed that 96 percent of blacklisted fishing vessels carrying the flag of GOG states carried the Nigerian flag as country of registration when they were reported sighted in GOG maritime domain.

Under maritime law, all merchant vessels must be registered to and documented by a country. The country of registration, commonly referred to the 'flag state' assumes primary responsibility and accepts to exercise regulatory control over the actions of the vessel in its waters and on high seas. The vessel is bound by the laws

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of its flag state. Vessel registration and the role and responsibilities of flag states towards their vessel, and vice versa, are defined under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). INTERPOL report of 2014 revealed that most blacklisted IUU vessels in the GOG are re-registered in Nigeria owing to poor registration process and requirements. For instance, a blacklisted vessel, FV Thunder, has been re-registered multiple times in Nigeria with different names (INTERPOL Report, 2014). No doubt, less reliance on foreign exchange earnings from fish export in Nigeria for government spending undermines effective regulation of the industry. This situation result in many foreign fish vessel re-registering in Nigeria, so as to use the country as a 'gateway' to illegal fishing activities in the GOG. As observed by Adibe (2016) unfortunately, the extent to which 'flag state' may be held liable under UNCLOS for the IUU fishing activities of their vessels is less clearly defined. A look at table seven shows that Nigeria's culpability in IUU fishing in the GOG has gained international attention as the country was blacklisted by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the United States Department of Commerce in its 2015 and 2017 reports. Nigeria's weak fishing laws that make it easy for vessels to engage in IUU fishing in the maritime domain of GOG was particularly attributed for the blacklisting the country. According to NOAA report of 2015 as cited by Adibe (2016), Ghana was the first GOG state to make the list in its 2013 report aimed at public shaming and placing sanctions or embargoes on aqua products from blacklisted countries, it however made considerable effort to address the problem through effective regulation of the industry.

Table Seven: NOAA Bi-Annual Blacklist of Countries over IUU Fishing

Year	GOG Countries in the Blacklist
2009 (Inaugural Report)	None
2011 (Covering 2009 and 2010 Activities)	None
2013 (Covering 2011 and 2012 Activities)	Ghana
2015 (Covering 2013 and 2014 Activities)	Nigeria
2017 (Covering 2015 and 2016 Activities)	Nigeria

Source: Authors' Compilation from NOAA Bi-Annual Reports for Various Years

CONCLUSION

This paper specifically analyzed the contradictions of oil governance in Nigeria and their implications for the rise in IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea (GOG). Our findings showed that the rentier management of oil in Nigeria which results in excessive reliance on oil wealth for government budgetary spending leads to poor commitment of the Nigeria government as a sub-regional power in the GOG to cooperate with other states in the GOG to tackle IUU fishing. This has led to massive fishing revenue loss with the situation worsening as seen in most of the data presented. Data showing the culpability of Nigeria in escalating the crime in the GOG were also presented. In light of these findings, we recommend the need for Nigerian government to diversify its economy so as to attract investors in non-oil sectors like agriculture and improve technical capacity to regulate fisheries in order to drastically reduce the incidence of IUU fishing in the GOG since the country is the most exploited in the region for IUU fishing.

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